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Abstract:  
 
For a number of years now, some leading economists became interested in 
studying global comparative opinion data from the World Values Survey 
(Alesina, Algan et al, 2015; Alesina, Giuliano, et al, 2015). The interest of the 
economics profession in the relationship between religion and economic growth 
certainly is a factor contributing to the rise of the present methodological 
approach, also employed in this study (McCleary and Barro, 2006). Following 
Hayek, 1998 we think that values like hard work - which brings success-, 
competition, which is the essence of a free market economy together with the 
private ownership of business, play an overwhelming role in twenty-first century 
capitalism and cannot be overlooked in empirical global value research. While 
Islam has been studied abundantly in this context in recent years, empirical, 
World Values Survey based evidence on Catholicism is more scattered.  
 
Independent from one’s religious affiliation, it is certain that current global 
developments, characterized by mass migration and the rise of populism in the 
industrialized West, culminating in the recent presidential election victory of 
Mr. Donald Trump in the United States of America, suggest to take a closer look 
again at the values held by global adherents of the Roman Catholic Church, 
which is the religious organization, which still commands the largest following 
among the citizens of Western democracies.  
 
Without pretending to be a prophet, the Roman Catholic Church could emerge 
as an actor which will be at the center of global events news in the weeks and 
months to come, making necessary a detached and empirical analysis of the 
opinions and attitudes of its global rank and file. The current Pope of the Roman 
Catholic Church, Pope Francis I, will be already 80 years on December 17, 
2016. How much of his agenda of a more decentralized Church is still 
unfinished? The Pope’s 80th birthday could be a watershed in the current 
Papacy, since nowadays all Roman Catholic bishops resign from office at the 
age of 80, and even the electors in the College of Cardinals, electing a new 
Pope, must nowadays be under age 80.  
 
Like Pope Francis I, the new Secretary General of the United Nations, Antonio 
Guterres, is a “progressive Catholic” who shares with the current Pope the 
values of social inclusion and openness for refugees. In the United States, the 
values of Roman Catholic immigrants have recently become the subject of 
heated and divisive controversies. During the election campaign of Mr. Donald 
Trump, he repeatedly used very strong insults against the majority Roman 
Catholic 12 million Mexican immigrants describing them as “rapists” and 
“thieves”, indicating that he firmly thinks that they fundamentally differ in their 
basic societal values from mainstream American society.  
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Our data are from two sets of such reliable and regularly repeated global opinion 
surveys: The World Values Survey (WVS) and the European Social Survey 
(ESS). Our statistical calculations were performed by the routine and standard 
SPSS statistical program (SPSS XXIII), and relied on the so-called oblique 
rotation of the factors, underlying the correlation matrix. In each comparison, we 
evaluated the democratic civil society commitment of the overall population and 
of the practicing Roman Catholics, i.e. those Catholics who attend Sunday Mass 
regularly, the so-called dominicantes.  
 
Our main population-weighted global research results rather caution us against 
the view that the Catholic global rank and file will follow the Church’s 
substantially weakened leadership in endorsing a liberal asylum and migration 
policy. 13.40% of Roman Catholic dominicantes reject neighbors of a different 
religion; 19,60% are openly anti-Semitic as defined by the admittedly limited 
and restrictive World Values Survey item about rejecting to have a Jewish 
neighbor (six decades after the Second Vatican Council), and 48.05% are for a 
tough migration policy. Dominicantes constitute only 45% of the population-
weighted total of Roman Catholics on earth. The top 10 Catholic superpowers 
are the Catholic communities of Mexico; Brazil; Philippines; United States; 
Italy; Poland; Colombia; Nigeria; India; and Peru (in descending order of size) 
which in between them share more than 70% of global dominicantes. Cross-
checking with recent surveys of global anti-Semitism (ADL-100), it emerges 
that the political cultures of the Catholic superpowers Poland; Colombia and 
Peru are still plagued by a rate of more than 30% of anti-Semitism each. 
 
The American sociologist Ronald Inglehart is right in emphasizing the close 
connection between the religious factor and the level of a country’s socio-
economic development. The overwhelming strength of still existing Catholic 
activism is to be found in the global South, while the developed countries are 
strongly affected by secularization. The Catholic communities in Singapore; 
Malaysia; El Salvador; United States; and Poland are most connected to the 
Church irrespective of the levels of the GDP per capita. Judging from their 
Church attendance rates, they best withered the storms of secularization, while 
the Catholic communities in the three post-communist countries Moldova; 
Albania; and Latvia; as well as the Catholic communities in Uruguay and 
Finland have the lowest Church attendance rates irrespective of their GDP per 
capita. 
 
Based on European Social Survey-based criteria that include pro-immigration 
attitudes, Euro-multiculturalism, the rejection of racism, personal multicultural 
experience, and the rejection of right-wing culturalism, it is fair to suggest that 
in not a single European country, practicing Catholics were more liberal in their 
attitudes towards immigration than overall society. Only in Germany, there was 
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any relevant active Catholic support for liberal attitudes, as measured by our 
index, while opposition to them was especially strong in Ireland, Slovenia and 
Austria.  
 
The global country-based evidence based on the World Values Survey also 
indicates that only in a limited number of countries, Catholic dominicantes are at 
the forefront of a democratic, open society, based on such factor analytical 
criteria, well compatible with the theoretical literature as: 
 
1. The non-violent and law-abiding society (Tyler and Darley, 1999) 
2. Democracy movement (Huntington, 1993) 
3. Climate of personal non-violence (APA, 1993) 
4. Trust in institutions (Alesina and Ferrara, 2000; Fukuyama, 1995) 
5. Happiness, good health (Post, 2005) 
6. No redistributive religious fundamentalism (Huntington, 2000) 
7. Accepting the market economy (Elzinga, 1999; Glahe and Vorhies, 1989; 
Hayek, 2012; Novak, 1991) 
8. Feminism (Ferber and Nelson, 2009) 
9. Involvement in politics (Lipset, 1959) 
10. Optimism and engagement (Oishi et al., 1999) 
11. No welfare mentality, acceptancy of the Calvinist work ethics (Giorgi and 
Marsh, 1990) 
 
On these scales, and weighted by the Eigenvalues of these factors, the best 
performing Roman Catholic dominicantes communities were to be found in 
Trinidad and Tobago; Ghana; Australia; Germany; and the United States, while 
the worst performances were recorded in South Africa; Philippines; Lebanon; 
Belarus; and Peru. We also document the vital difference ratios between the 
active Catholic and overall society. Only the active Catholic publics in the 
Ukraine; Ghana; Trinidad and Tobago; Chile; Lebanon; Germany; Colombia; 
Brazil; Mexico; Ecuador; Rwanda; United States; Poland; and the Philippines 
were more committed to the goals of an overall democratic civil society than the 
general populations of these countries, while in several countries, most 
dramatically in South Africa, Spain and Peru, active Catholic publics had to be 
considered as less supportive of a democratic civil society than the general 
publics of their countries. 
 
Our overall assessment, however, produces not only pessimistic results. One of 
our hypotheses is that the Roman Catholic Second Vatican Council and its 
commitment to inter-religious tolerance in many ways paved the way for the 
high degree of societal tolerance in predominantly Catholic Western countries 
over many decades, irrespective of the fact whether Catholics in those countries 
live a secular or a more religious life. The empirical analysis of global tolerance, 
based on promax factor analysis, using the three most salient xenophobia items 
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from the WVS data base (rejection of neighbors of a different race, immigrants 
and foreign workers, people of a different religion) explains 63,502 % of total 
variance and is based on 191620 representative global citizens, reaffirming the 
prevalence of tolerance in many predominantly Catholic countries. Best 
performers were: Argentina; Andorra; Sweden; Canada; and New Zealand; 
worst performances: Libya; Palestinian Occupied Territories; Azerbaijan; 
Bangladesh; and India. These findings are also supported by a kind of “UNDP 
Index” of the civic culture of global society by international comparison with the 
existing data, selecting the WVS items on the civic culture of tolerance, 
accepting gender equality, secularization and non-violence. Sweden, Norway 
and Andorra are the countries best combining the civic culture of tolerance, 
accepting gender equality, secularization and non-violence, while the three 
worst placed nations on earth are Mali, Bahrein and Yemen. All Muslim 
countries in our 77 countries and territories with full data which were under 
investigation here were below the global average; and the best placed Muslim 
country is post-Soviet Kazakhstan; and the best placed Arab country is Qatar. 
Considering this evidence, Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah el-Sisi was right to 
say at the World Economic Forum in Davos, 2015, that Muslims need to adapt 
their religious discourse to the present and eliminate elements of their rhetoric 
that could foster violence. Precisely the Second Vatican Council provided the 
Roman Catholic Church with the theoretical tools to leave behind the centuries 
of anti-Semitism and intolerance which are too well-known in history. 
 
We also found that at lower levels of socio-economic development, active 
Roman Catholicism indeed is a countervailing force of humanizing societies, but 
it fails to influence developments at higher “stages of development”. We finally 
show the different indicators for the major denominational groups in the United 
States of America. By far, Judaism is at the forefront of the positive value 
developments, our work and its indicators attempt to capture. Unfortunately, 
Roman Catholicism in the United States still lags behind Judaism and 
Protestantism concerning its value development of its rank and file, but still, the 
overall value development indicator is higher than that of the average of United 
States society. 
 
At the end of this essay, we emphasize that progressive Catholicism would be 
well advised to come to terms with the real challenge which Islamist terrorism 
poses for humanity. Naiveté will not be sufficient to confront the situation of the 
two trains of extremism in the West now about to collide, about which Rabbi 
Pinchas Goldschmidt was speaking recently to the European Parliament: 
xenophobic racism and Islamist anti-Semitism and extremism. 
 
JEL Classification Numbers: C43, F5, Z12, D73 
 
Keywords: C43 - Index Numbers and Aggregation; F5 - International Relations 
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Introduction 
 
Independent from one’s religious affiliation, it is certain that current global 
developments, characterized by mass migration and the rise of populism in the 
industrialized West, culminating in the recent presidential election victory of 
Mr. Donald Trump in the United States of America, suggest to take a closer look 
again at the values held by global adherents of the Roman Catholic Church, 
which is the religious organization, which still commands the largest following 
among the citizens of Western democracies, and which, by its self-definition 
(John Paul II, 1994), should be a religious congregation committed to the ideals 
of neighborly love to the needy, openness for the weakest and human 
understanding. The current leadership of the Roman Catholic Church, headed by 
Pope Francis I, takes an especially liberal and conciliatory view of migration 
and refugee issues (Kasper, 2015; Scanone, 2016), which is in stark contrast to 
the restrictive attitudes taken by populist politicians like Mr. Donald Trump in 
America or the current Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orban in Europe. Do 
Roman Catholics, practicing their faith, today follow the advice of their Church 
leaders on issues of migration and xenophobia, and is the Roman Catholic 
Church really a remaining bastion of the democratic center in the West? 
 
There is of course a vast literature on the Roman Catholic Church and its history 
over the ages (Brustein, 2003; Hastings, 1991; Koschorke et al., 2007; Michael, 
2008; Perreau-Saussine, 2012; Phayer, 2000, 2001), and also on the legacy of 
Pope John Paul II (Bernstein and Politi, 1996; Fischer and Klenicki, 1987, 1995; 
Kupczak, 2000; Weigel, 2001), who was very influential in pioneering 
especially the Judeo-Christian dialogue, and under whose Papacy the Vatican 
opened diplomatic relations with the State of Israel in 1993. 1 
 
In this essay, we would like to reflect then in a detached and empirical way on 
the role of the active, global Catholics in the formation of global values, using 
advanced methods of comparative social science research. We are not interested 
here in the question, which asylum and migration policies are correct, or which 
path should be followed in this respect by the developed, rich, Western 
democracies. We are only interested in what the active Roman Catholics – in 
comparison with overall society -, think about the most pressing issues of our 
time, including migration. So, the question resembles the old question: how 
many divisions, the Pope has? by the Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin. 2 The present 
essay is thus well within a large and growing tradition to study “real existing” 
Catholicism in an empirical social scientific framework (Fox et al., 2004; Jelen 
                                                          
1 http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Bilateral/Pages/Israel-
Vatican_Diplomatic_Relations.aspx 
2 On the words used by Joseph Stalin, see Tausch, 2011 
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and Wilcox, 1998; O’Collins, 2008; Philpott and Shah, 2011; Reese, 1996; 
Rudolph and Piscatori, 1997; Sandier and Sandier, 2004; Shelledy, 2004; 
Valuer, 1971). Global secularization trends notwithstanding, the Roman Church 
still commands not only the fellowship of more than 1.2 billion global citizens, 3 
but it also continues to be a highly significant actor in international relations. 
Today, important studies on the Church do not exclude the Roman Catholic 
Papacy (Gillis, 2016), nor the overall role of the Roman Catholic Church in 
international relations (Napolitano, 2015).  
 
Needless to say, that in view of the current global migration and political 
processes, which suggest a sharp polarization in the Western countries on the 
issues of migration, such solid social scientific information is ever more 
necessary. Our interest to study active global Roman Catholicism also has 
another background, lamentably often overlooked in Western countries: today, 
Christianity is the most persecuted religion, world-wide. 4 While empirical 
studies on global Islam abound, especially after 9/11, there is a real dearth of 
sociological, value-oriented surveys on global Catholicism or Christianity in 
general. And yet, around 100 million Christians, above all in several Muslim 
countries, are persecuted and each month, 322 Christians are killed for their 
faith; 214 Churches and Christian properties are destroyed, and also each month, 
772 forms of violence are committed against Christians, such as beatings, 
abductions, rapes, arrests and forced marriages. 5 The ten lamentable record 
holders where these persecutions take place are North Korea, Iraq, Eritrea, 
Afghanistan, Syria, Pakistan, Somalia, Sudan and Libya.  
 
There are also more immediate and pressing current world affairs reasons 
suggesting that it is time to write such an analysis: 
 
 The current Pope of the Roman Catholic Church, Pope Francis I, will be 
already 80 years on December 17, 2016. How much of his agenda of a 
more decentralized Church is still unfinished? How do the values of 
compassion, tolerance, social and also ecological justice, which are so 
much championed by this current Latin American Pope, also reflect 
themselves in the opinions of those Catholics who celebrate, as mandated 
by the Church, each Sunday the Roman Catholic Church Service, the 
                                                          
3 http://www.nationmaster.com/; http://www.catholic-hierarchy.org/; 
http://www.pewforum.org/2013/02/13/the-global-catholic-population/; 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-21443313 
4 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/27/dying-for-christianity-millions-at-risk-
amid-rise-in-persecution-across-the-globe 
5 https://www.opendoorsusa.org/christian-persecution/ 
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Eucharist (John Paul II, 1994)? 6 And how are these values reflected in 
the thinking of the active Roman Catholics in general? Without 
pretending to be a prophet, the Pope’s 80th birthday could be a watershed 
in the current Papacy, since nowadays all Roman Catholic bishops resign 
from office at the age of 80, and even the electors in the College of 
Cardinals, electing a new Pope, must nowadays be under age 80.  
 
 Like Pope Francis I, the new Secretary General of the United Nations, 
Antonio Guterres, is a “progressive Catholic” who shares with the current 
Pope the values of social inclusion and openness for refugees.7 As the 
Italian newspaper “La Stampa” correctly emphasized, this former 
Socialist Prime Minister of Portugal said after his meeting with Pope 
Francis I on December 6, 2013 that for him, Guterres, the Catholic 
Church has always been a very important voice in the defense of 
refugees’ and migrants’ rights. 8 With a representative of moderate 
liberation theology at the helm in the Vatican and a like-minded 
Portuguese Roman Catholic Social Democrat in charge at the U.N. 
headquarters in New York, even a new axis of progressive Catholicism in 
international relations could develop, also as a counterweight to the 
tendencies towards populism and xenophobia in the Western world, 
especially since Mr. Donald Trump’s ascendancy to the White House in 
Washington. 
 
 In the United States, the values of Roman Catholic immigrants have 
recently become the subject of heated and divisive controversies. During 
the election campaign of Mr. Donald Trump, he repeatedly used very 
strong insults against the majority Roman Catholic 12 million Mexican 
immigrants describing them as “rapists” and “thieves”, indicating that he 
firmly thinks that they fundamentally differ in their basic societal values 
from mainstream American society. 9 But really how different the values 
of the mainly Catholic Mexican population are from the general 
population in the United States? 
 
                                                          
6 In difference to some other Christian denominations, participation in the Sunday Church 
service is obligatory for Roman Catholics, see especially 
http://www.vatican.va/archive/ccc_css/archive/catechism/p2s2c1a3.htm 
7 http://www.lastampa.it/2016/10/07/vaticaninsider/eng/the-vatican/refugees-the-holy-see-
gains-a-new-ally-at-the-un-rl517eB5LSGkyA109xa9KI/pagina.html 
8 http://www.lastampa.it/2016/10/07/vaticaninsider/eng/the-vatican/refugees-the-holy-see-
gains-a-new-ally-at-the-un-rl517eB5LSGkyA109xa9KI/pagina.html 
9 See especially: http://www.nytimes.com/topic/person/donald-trump and 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/9-outrageous-things-donald-trump-has-said-about-
latinos_us_55e483a1e4b0c818f618904b 
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In our article, we share the realist hypothesis of an important contemporary 
Jewish thinker, Rabbi Pinchas Goldschmidt, about two trains of extremism in 
the West now about to collide. What is to be understood by this? 
 
Speaking to the European Parliament […], Rabbi Pinchas Goldschmidt said 
that Jews in Europe feel as if they are standing on a train track with two "trains 
coming at each other with ever increasing speed." “One train is the train of 
radical Islam and Islamic terrorism... The other train is the anti-Semitism of old 
Europe, the extreme right,” Goldschmidt said […] the recent terror wave has 
made the public realize there is an "existential problem for the very fabric of 
Europe." A […] unit should be created to protect the outer borders of the EU to 
“rein in the waves of millions of immigrants ... flooding Europe and threatening 
the future character of the European continent,” he said. In order to do so, 
Goldschmidt highlighted the need to "integrate them into the European value 
system." Making an explicit effort to distance himself from anti-Islamic rhetoric 
common among Europe's far-right parties, Goldschmidt emphasized that “Islam 
is not our enemy. The moderate Muslims are the victims of radical Islam like we 
Jews are and every other European is.” 10 
 
Where do global and where do European Roman Catholics really stand in this 
context regardless of what the Church officially pronounces in its magisterium? 
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Background 
 
The systematic social scientific study of global values and opinions, used in this 
essay, has of course a long and fruitful history in the social sciences (Norris and 
Inglehart, 2011; furthermore, on global value change Aleman and Woods, 2015; 
Alexander and Welzel, 2011; Ciftci, 2010; Davidov et al., 2011; Hofstede, 2001; 
Hofstede and Minkov, 2010; Hofstede et al., 2010; Inglehart and Norris, 2010; 
Minkov and Hofstede, 2011, 2013; Schwartz, 2006a, 2006b, 2007a, 2007b, 
2009). Such studies are made possible by the availability of systematic and 
comparative opinion surveys over time under the auspices of leading 
representatives of the social science research community, featuring the 
global/and or the European populations with a fairly constant questionnaire for 
several decades now. The original data are made freely available to the global 
scientific publics and render themselves for systematic, multivariate analysis of 
opinion structures on the basis of the original anonymous interview data. 12 Our 
data are from two sets of such reliable and regularly repeated global opinion 
                                                          
10 http://www.haaretz.com/world-news/europe/1.745507 
11 The body of official declarations, like Papal ex cathedra pronouncements, Papal 
Encyclicals, but also Episcopal Letters by Bishops et cetera 
12 http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs.jsp and http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/ 
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surveys: The World Values Survey (WVS) and the European Social Survey 
(ESS). 
 
The World Values Survey (WVS), which was started in 1981, consists of nationally 
representative surveys using a common questionnaire conducted in approximately 
100 countries, which make up some 90 percent of the world’s population. The 
WVS has become the largest non-commercial, cross-national, time series 
investigation of human beliefs and values ever conducted. As of the time of 
writing this article, it includes interviews with almost 400,000 respondents. The 
countries included in the WVS project comprise practically all of the world’s 
major cultural zones. 
 
Representative data from the European Social Survey (ESS) for 2014 are 
available from Austria; Belgium; Czech Republic; Denmark; Estonia; Finland; 
France; Germany; Ireland; Netherlands; Norway; Poland; Slovenia; Sweden; 
and Switzerland, and are based on more than 28.000 representative interviews in 
these countries. Earlier ESS data also included many more additional countries, 
including the Ukraine and Israel. As such, the ESS is the largest and freely 
available social science multivariate data base on the opinions of Europeans. 
 
For a number of years now, also some leading economists became interested in 
studying global comparative opinion data from the World Values Survey 
(Alesina, Algan et al, 2015; Alesina, Giuliano, et al, 2015). The interest of the 
economics profession in the relationship between religion and economic growth 
certainly was a factor contributing to the rise of the present methodological 
approach, also employed in this study (McCleary and Barro, 2006). 
 
In the present article, we feature on Roman Catholicism in the framework of the 
“civic culture” of their respective societies (Almond and Verba, 2015) and the 
role played by Catholicism in it (Inglehart, 1998; Silver and Dowley, 2000). 
Studies on Muslim opinions were a growing focus of research since the 1990s, 
especially since the terror attacks of 9/11 in New York City. At that time, it is 
said that the then Secretary of Defense of the Bush administration, Mr. Donald 
Rumsfeld, exclaimed in despair that we don’t have Gallup opinion survey data 
to know what actually Arab publics think about these attacks. 13 Compared to 
                                                          
13 Dalia Mogahed from the Gallup poll organization said in this context: “And after 9-11, our 
[Gallup] CEO Jim Clifton just looked around realized that no one really knew what was on 
the minds of a billion Muslims. He was watching a press conference where Donald Rumsfeld 
was asked how do Muslims feel about these attacks? And Donald Rumsfeld’s response was 
“Well, I don’t know, it’s not like you can take a Gallup poll.” And it was sort of this that 
sparked the need to take that mission that Gallup started 70 years ago to the entire world. 
Because at no time is it more important to help people to be heard, to actually get the views of 
ordinary people to leaders, than now when there is so much confusion and 
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the now existing veritable flood of high quality survey-based studies on Muslim 
communities around the globe, the available comparable opinion-survey based 
evidence on global Catholicism is rather scarce (Tausch, 2011, Tausch and 
Moaddel, 2009). 
 
An important starting point in the choice of the values under study here is that 
ever since the end of Communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union there 
were scholars in the West who thought that now the definitive hour of the 
triumph of democracy and the market economy has arrived (Fukuyama, 2006). 
Many saw with justification the positive role played by the Roman Catholic 
Church in the victory of democracy and the market economy in Eastern Europe 
in the time period between 1989 and 1991 (Novak, 1984, 1991; Weigel, 2010). 
 
In this context one must also consider that centuries of Roman Catholic 
warnings about human rights, the Enlightenment and “modernism” to the 
contrary (Tausch, 2011), there is now a solid tradition of Roman Catholic 
thinking in favor of democracy ever since the writings of the influential French 
theologian Jacques Maritain (1882 – 1973) (Maritain, 1936, Brackley, 2004) and 
the Jewish philosopher Henri Louis Bergson (1859 – 1941) (Bergson 1935). Of 
course, Bergson formally was not a Roman Catholic, but he felt very close to 
Roman Catholicism during his later years, and died as a Jew during the Vichy 
Government’s persecution of Jews in France in 1941. His “Two Sources of 
Morale and Religion” even proved to be an important inspiration for Poppers 
“Open Society and its Enemies” (Popper, 2012). He provided Catholicism with 
the most consistent philosophical reasoning in favor of a democratic open 
society ever to have been authored. 
 
This pre-WWII liberal democratic Catholicism came to bear its full fruits in the 
trajectory of the Christian democratic parties in Europe and in Latin America 
after the Second World War, which were so instrumental in the postwar period 
in countries like Germany and Italy, and which also played a major role in the 
democratization of the countries of Latin America in the 1980s and 1990s (Linz 
and Stepan, 1996; Mainwaring, 2003; Whitehead, 1996). The interesting 
research question already voiced by Lipset, 1959 (see also Moyser, 2005) about 
the affinity of the Judeo-Christian heritage to democracy is now of course open 
to further empirical investigations. Without question, towering figures of 
Western democratic political leadership after 1945, like the German Konrad 
Adenauer, the Chilean Eduardo Frei Montalva, the Italian Alcide de Gasperi and 
the Frenchman Charles de Gaulle were deeply motivated by the idea of a 
combination of Christian values and democracy. 
 
                                                          
misunderstanding”; see http://www.virtualmosque.com/society/domestic-affairs/an-
exclusive-virtualmosque-interview-with-dalia-mogahed/  
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Nevertheless, Catholic authoritarian and anti-Semitic traditions (Brustein, 2003; 
Gruemmer, 1997), positioned against democracy, are too well known in history, 
and still plagued many countries, especially in Europe, for much of the 19th 
Century and the first half of the 20th Century (Conway, 2008; Laqueur, 1997; 
Phayer, 2000; Pollard, 2007; Ward, 2013). Then, just how thin is the ice that 
now separates global contemporary Catholic publics from the temptations of a 
re-emergence of Catholic authoritarianism (Pollard, 2007)? After all, regimes, 
where Catholics played a prominent role, such as Croatia or Slovakia in World 
War II, were not only “clerical fascist” dictatorships, but they were also allied 
with Hitler’s Germany and played a terrible and active role in the Shoah 
(Goldhagen, 2007; Hoppenbrouwers, 2004; Phayer, 2000). Or is Roman 
Catholicism today a real stable bulwark of democracy and the market economy? 
And is democratic Roman Catholicism, symbolized by such personalities as 
Jean Monnet and Konrad Adenauer, not only at the cradle of the process of 
European integration (Nelsen and Guth, 2003), but has the “Open Society” 
(Popper, 2012) now finally triumphed over its enemies in the minds and hearts 
of the global Catholics, including a permanent resistance to the temptations of a 
return to Roman Catholic authoritarianism? 
 
The analysis of our comparative data makes the rethinking of the entire tradition 
of empirical comparative value research in the direction of the classical political 
science research on the “civic culture” of countries and even entire global cultures 
necessary and useful. Here, one encounters the full legacy of twentieth-century 
modern political scientist Gabriel Abraham Almond (1911–2002): with his deep 
understanding of the normative aspects of human society he perhaps came closest 
to capturing the dilemmas of Western and non-Western, non-Muslim and Muslim 
contemporary societies of today, as they emerge from the empirical data. He did 
so especially by pointing out the many adverse trends in the civic culture in 
leading Western democracies themselves, brought about by the current 
contemporary erosion of social capital, a declining civic engagement, and civic 
trust (Almond, 1996). As causes of this contemporary decline in civic 
engagement, Almond cites in reference to the work of the political scientist Robert 
D. Putnam the weakening of the family (Putnam, 1993). A second major factor 
that Almond cites is the transformation of leisure by the electronic media. This 
tidal wave of value decay has begun to affect the Catholic Communities in Africa, 
Asia, Latin America and Oceania as well. 
 
The civic culture approach presupposes that a political culture congruent with a 
stable democracy involves a high degree of consensus concerning the legitimacy 
of democratic institutions and the content of public policy (for a survey of the 
relevant literature, see Tausch, 2016a).  
 
Inglehart by contrast developed an interpretation of global value change that rests 
on a well-known two-dimensional scale of global values and global value change. 
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It is based on the statistical technique of factor analysis of up to some 20 key 
World Values Survey variables. The two Inglehart dimensions are: (1) the 
traditional/secular-rational dimension and (2) the survival/self-expression 
dimension. These two dimensions explain more than 70 percent of the cross-
national variance in a factor analysis of ten indicators, and each of these 
dimensions is strongly correlated with scores of other important variables. For 
Inglehart and Baker, 2000, all of the preindustrial societies show relatively low 
levels of tolerance for abortion, divorce, and homosexuality; tend to emphasize 
male dominance in economic and political life, deference to parental authority, 
and the importance of family life, and are relatively authoritarian; and most of 
them place strong emphasis on religion. Advanced industrial societies tend to 
have the opposite characteristics (Tausch, Heshmati and Karoui, 2015). 
 
Inglehart, therefore, predicted a more or less generalized global increase in human 
security in parallel with the gradual waning of the religious phenomenon in the 
majority of countries across the globe. Inglehart spells out what tendencies are 
brought about by the waning of the religious element in advanced Western 
democracies: higher levels of tolerance for abortion, divorce, homosexuality; the 
erosion of parental authority, the decrease of the importance of family life, etc. 
When survival is uncertain, cultural diversity seems threatening. When there isn't 
"enough to go around," foreigners are seen as dangerous outsiders who may take 
away one's sustenance. People cling to traditional gender roles and sexual norms, 
and emphasize absolute rules and familiar norms in an attempt to maximize 
predictability in an uncertain world. Conversely, when survival begins to be taken 
for granted, ethnic and cultural diversity become increasingly acceptable - indeed, 
beyond a certain point, diversity is not only tolerated, it may even be positively 
valued because it is seen as interesting and stimulating. In advanced industrial 
societies, people seek out foreign restaurants to taste new cuisines; they pay large 
sums of money and travel long distances to experience exotic cultures. Changing 
gender roles and sexual norms no longer seem threatening. Recalculating results 
from different waves of the World Values Survey data, Tausch, Heshmati and 
Karoui, 2015 however claim to have discovered a large-scale implosion of the 
self-expression values, deemed by Inglehart and his followers to be so vital for 
the future of democracy in the wake of the global economic crisis of 2008. 
Arguing in the framework of Inglehart’s theory, Tausch, Heshmati and Karoui, 
2015 would imply that now setbacks in the further development of an open society 
in leading Western countries could happen more frequently. 
 
Sociologists, working with the unique comparative and longitudinal opinion 
survey data from the World Values Survey have discovered that there are pretty 
constant and long-term patterns of change in the direction of secularization, 
which also affect the predominantly Roman Catholic countries (Inglehart, 2006; 
Inglehart and Norris, 2003; Norris and Inglehart, 2011). Inglehart and his 
associates firmly believe that the ability of the Roman Catholic hierarchy to tell 
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people how to live their lives is declining steadily. 14 This opinion was shared 
among others also by the late Jesuit father and professor of sociology at 
Innsbruck University, Julius Morel (1927-2003; Morel, 1972, 1977, 1986, 1997, 
1998, 2003).  
 
For Inglehart, such phenomena as bribery, corruption, tax evasion, cheating the 
state to get government benefits for which one wouldn’t be entitled, but also the 
counterveiling healthy activism of citizens in volunteer organizations, already 
described by Etzioni, 1998, hardly exist, while the rich database of the World 
Values Survey provides ample evidence about these phenomena and their 
occurrence in world societies. The economics profession, that is, mathematical, 
quantitative economics, already began to make large-scale use of the World 
Values Survey data, integrating the WVS country level results into international 
economic growth accounting (Alesina and Giuliano, 2014; Barro and McCleary, 
2003, 2006). Thus, the art of “growth accounting” received a new and important 
input (Barro, 1991, 1998, 2004; 2012; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1991, 1993; Guiso 
et al., 2003). Following Hayek, 1998 we think that values like hard work - which 
brings success-, competition, which is the essence of a free market economy 
together with the private ownership of business, play an overwhelming role in 
twenty-first century capitalism and cannot be overlooked in empirical global 
value research. 
 
As already highlighted above, the issue of immigration now polarizes more and 
more opinions in the developed Western democracies. This sharp polarization in 
Germany and other European countries about the future of immigration policy 
gathered pace especially since Chancellor Angela Merkel’s policy of invitation 
and welcoming refugees in late summer, 2015 (Carrera et al., 2015; Park, 2015; 
Sengupta, 2015; Tausch, 2015; 2016). 15 Also in other Western countries, there 
seems to be a strong backlash against liberal immigration policy. Prominent 
examples would be the case of the United States and Australia (Albertson and 
Gadarian, 2016; Fry, 2016; Giroux, 2016; Hogan and Haltiner, 2015; Hollifield 
et al., 2014; Inglehart and Norris, 2016; Oates and Moe, 2016; Wright, 2015). For 
the first time since 1945, the chance is real that far-right wing parties and 
candidates could gain power at the ballot boxes in many Western countries. 
Asylum and migration greatly polarize the political landscape everywhere.  
 
                                                          
14 http://ur.umich.edu/0405/Apr11_05/11.shtml 
15 http://ec.europa.eu/echo/refugee-crisis_en; 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/sep/07/angela-merkel-defends-german-
immigration-policy-elections-afd; http://www.ibtimes.com/germany-wants-christian-
migrants-not-muslims-angela-merkels-party-wants-refugees-2413054; 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/17/refugees-did-not-bring-terrorism-to-
germany-says-angela-merkel 
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The current global leadership of the Roman Catholic Church by contrast seems 
to take a completely liberal position on the issues of asylum and immigration, 16 
which might also reflect the fact that the overwhelming majority of Roman 
Catholics and candidates for the priesthood now live in the global South and 
East and not in the secularized global North, and that an increasing share of the 
faithful in the rich countries and also increasingly among the clergy themselves 
have a so-called “immigration background”. Some figures recently released by 
the Vatican Press Office 17 dramatically highlight this view: 
 
 The number of Catholic priests, diocesan and religious, from 2005 to 
2014 increased by 9.381 from 406,411 to 415,792. However, this increase 
was not homogeneous. In Africa and Asia, there was an increase of 32.6 
per cent and 27.1 per cent respectively, whereas in Europe the number 
declined by 8 per cent, and in Oceania by 1.7 per cent. 
 
 Candidates for the priesthood, diocesan and religious, passed from 
114,439 in 2005 to 116,939 in 2014. Africa, Asia and Oceania had a 
growth rate of 21, 14 and 7.2 per cent respectively, while in Europe there 
was a decline of 17.5 per cent and in America, especially due to a 
negative tendency in Latin America, there was a decrease of 7.9 per cent. 
 
 The strongest increase in seminarians was in Africa (+30.9%), and Asia 
(+29.4%), while Europe and the Americas registered a decrease in their 
numbers of 21.7% and 1.9% respectively. 
 
From a purely organizational sociological perspective (Burrell and Morgan, 
1985), it is even very beneficial for Roman Catholic Church leaders to be on the 
side of immigrants, since immigrants from the global Catholic East and South 
now not only fill the benches of the otherwise more and more empty churches of 
Northern congregations, but also of the theological academies and seminars. In a 
way, Roman Catholic liberalism vis-à-vis mass immigration might be even a 
convenient counter-weight to the otherwise unhalted tendencies of secularization 
in the rich countries (Norris and Inglehart, 2011, 2015). 
 
The recent PEW Study on Global Catholicism made these tendencies clearer 
still: the days of the European Church and Catholic Europe are definitively over. 
18 In 1910, Catholics comprised about half (48%) of all Christians and 17% of 
the world’s total population. A century later, Catholics still comprise about half 
(50%) of Christians worldwide and 16% of the total global population. In 1910, 
Europe was home to about two-thirds of all global Roman Catholics, and nearly 
                                                          
16 https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/refugees-keep-streaming-into-europe-as-crisis-
continues-unabated/2015/09/06/8a330572-5345-11e5-b225-90edbd49f362_story.html 
17 https://press.vatican.va/content/salastampa/en/bollettino/pubblico/2016/03/05/160305b.html 
18 http://www.pewforum.org/2013/02/13/the-global-catholic-population/ 
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nine-in-ten lived either in Europe (65%) or Latin America (24%). By 2010, by 
contrast, only about a quarter of all Catholics (24%) lived in Europe. The largest 
share (39%) lived in Latin America and the Caribbean. 
 
Pope Francis’ 19 open and liberal positions on the European refugee crisis 
(Berryman, 2016; de Maio et al., 2016; Schmidt, 2015; Wills, 2016) are clear 
and to be seen in the framework of the current Pontiff’s overall commitment to a 
moderate non-Marxist and non-violent version of Latin American Liberation 
Theology (Müller et al., 2000; Petrella, 2004). As it is well-known, 
 
Pope Francis criticized the “self interests” prompting European Union leaders 
to enforce stringent immigration policies that shut out desperate refugees during 
his acceptance speech for the Charlemagne Prize — an award to promote 
European unification […] 
 
“I dream of a Europe where being a migrant is not a crime, but a summons to a 
greater commitment on behalf of the dignity of every human being,” Francis 
said. “I dream of a Europe that promotes and protects the rights of everyone, 
without neglecting its duties toward all. I dream of a Europe of which it will not 
be said that its commitment to human rights was its last utopia.” 
 
The clash with the majority of the world’s right-wing politicians, often speaking 
about “Christian Europe” or a “Christian West” could not be greater. Victor 
Orban, the Hungarian Prime Minister and the most vociferous critic of 
Chancellor Angela Merkel’s “open door” refugee policy, went on the record of 
saying 20 that Europe is in the grip of madness over immigration and refugees, 
and argued that he was defending European Christianity against a Muslim 
influx. “Everything which is now taking place before our eyes threatens to have 
explosive consequences for the whole of Europe,” Orbán wrote in Germany’s 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. His argument is simply that “Europe’s 
response [to the global refugee crisis] is madness. We must acknowledge that 
the European Union’s misguided immigration policy is responsible for this 
situation.” 21 He added: “Those arriving have been raised in another religion, 
and represent a radically different culture. Most of them are not Christians, but 
Muslims,” he said. “This is an important question, because Europe and 
European identity is rooted in Christianity.” And here, the true clash of world 
views of the Pope also with Republican President Elect Donald Trump could not 
be sharper: Pope Francis was even questioning Trump’s “Christianity”, 
                                                          
19 https://thinkprogress.org/in-powerful-speech-pope-francis-condemns-eu-leaders-efforts-to-
shut-out-refugees-c990c573a25e#.wvhfpdato. 
20 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/03/migration-crisis-hungary-pm-victor-
orban-europe-response-madness 
21 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/03/migration-crisis-hungary-pm-victor-
orban-europe-response-madness 
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rebuking him on his views on Islam and violence, and Donald Trump called the 
Pope’s remarks as “disgraceful”. 22 
 
Considering the current polarization in Europe on immigration policy (Tausch, 
2016a and 2016b) it is entirely conceivable that the old structure of the 
European political party systems, dominated for decades by Christian 
democratic, social democratic, liberal, and green parties has ultimately been 
transformed into a structure dominated by a sharp polarization between pro- and 
anti-immigration parties. Migration policy variables play a major role in our 
empirical analyses of the European Social Survey data. It is entirely feasible that 
the empirical data will show that Roman Catholic rank and file active Church 
members are as deeply divided on the issues of immigration as the rest of 
society. 
 
Data and methods 
 
So, this essay firmly shares the established methodology of World Values Survey 
- based comparative opinion research (Davidov et al., 2008; Inglehart, 2006; 
Norris and Inglehart, 2015; Tausch, Heshmati and Karoui, 2014). We should re-
iterate that our methodological approach is within a more general framework to 
study Roman Catholicism with the methodology of comparative and opinion-
survey based political science (Basanez and Inglehart, 2016; Brenner, 2016; 
Gryzmala-Busse, 2015, 2016; Hanson, 2014; Knippenberg, 2015; Manuel et al., 
2006; Norris and Inglehart, 2015).  
 
We are of course well aware of many past valuable attempts to arrive at 
theologically and social scientifically well-founded comparisons of global 
religions and civilizations in the growing international scientific tradition of 
ecumenical religious studies (Juergensmeyer, 2000, 2011, 2013, Küng, 1997, 
2002, Lenoir and Tardan-Masquelier, 1997; Lenoir, 2008, Röhrich, 2004, 2010; 
Sacks, 1998, 2003, 2005, 2014). However, our methodology of evaluating the 
opinions of global publics from the World Values Survey and European Social 
Survey data on the beliefs of the adherents of different global religions is based 
on recent advances in mathematical statistical factor analysis (Basilevsky, 2009; 
Cattell, 2012; Hedges and Olkin, 2014; Kline, 2014; McDonald, 2014; Mulaik, 
2009; Tausch, Heshmati and Karoui, 2014; Thompson, 2004). Such studies are 
based on existing comparative opinion survey data, which allow to project the 
underlying structures of the relationships between the variables.  
 
                                                          
22 https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/feb/18/donald-trump-pope-francis-christian-
wall-mexico-border and http://time.com/4436759/pope-francis-trump-radical-islam/ 
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Our statistical calculations were performed by the routine and standard SPSS 
statistical program (SPSS XXIII), 23 available at many academic research centers 
around the world, and relied on the so-called oblique rotation of the factors, 
underlying the correlation matrix (Abdi, 2003; Browne, 2001; Dunlap and York, 
2008; Kim, 2010). The SPSS routine chosen in this context was the so-called 
promax rotation of factors (Basanez et al., 2014; Braithwaite and Law, 1985; 
Browne, 2001; Fabrigar et al., 1999; Minkov, 2014; Suhr, 2012; Yesilada and 
Noordijk, 2010), which in many ways must be considered to be the best suited 
rotation of factors in the context of our research.24 Since both our data and the 
statistical methods used are available around the globe, any researcher can 
repeat our research exercise with the available open data and should be able to 
reproduce the same results as we did. 
 
In each comparison, based on the national factor scores for each of the factors, 
resulting from our research (for surveys of the factor analytical method see 
Tausch, Heshmati and Karoui, 2014, furthermore Clauß and Ebner, 1970; Dien 
et al., 2011; Dziuban and Shirkey, 1974; Finch, 2006; Gorsuch, 1983; Hotelling, 
1933; Jolliffe, 2002; Kieffer, 1998; McLeod et al., 2001; Rummel, 1970; 
Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001) we evaluated the democratic civil society 
commitment of the overall population and of the practicing Roman Catholics, 
i.e. those Catholics who attend Sunday Mass regularly, the so-called 
dominicantes.  
 
Due to too small country sample sizes for the weekly religious service attenders 
of most other major global denominations (i.e. like Buddhists, Hindus, Orthodox 
Christians, Protestants, Muslims, Buddhists, Hindus, et cetera), for whom 
weekly religious service attendance is not as strictly prescribed as for the Roman 
Catholics, we used also figures for monthly religious service attendances (called 
by us the mensuantes) at a later stage of our comparisons. We also introduced a 
category of people who at least sometimes still attend religious services over the 
years (called by us the more seculars), and the members of a religious 
denomination, who were really never attending religious services at all (called 
here the completely distant). For all analyzed groups and sub-groups, a 
minimum sample of at least 30 respondents per country had to be available in 
the original data sets to attempt reasonable predictions for the general or sectoral 
publics to be analyzed, thus keeping in line with standard traditions of empirical 
opinion survey research (Tausch, Heshmati and Karoui, 2014). 
 
                                                          
23 https://www-01.ibm.com/software/at/analytics/spss/ 
24 Older approaches often assumed that there is no correlation between the factors, best 
representing the underlying dimensions of the variables. But for example, in attempting to 
understand the recent pro-Brexit vote in the United Kingdom it would be ridiculous to assume 
that, say, there is no correlation between anti-immigration attitudes and anti-European Union 
attitudes.  
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In our study using the European Social Survey data we hoped to arrive at an 
index of nation-wide European voter liberalism, based on factor analysis, and 
we compared this liberalism of practicing Roman Catholics with that of the 
overall European population. Norris and Inglehart, 2016, in their study on the 
problems under scrutiny here, use similar variables, but their methodological 
approach was different. The ESS-dimensions used in our research endeavor 
were the following: 
 
 Allowing immigration from poorer countries inside and outside Europe 
 Allowing immigration of different race or the same race 
 Allowing immigration of Gypsies, Jews, Muslims 
 Attitudes on anti-discrimination policy 
 Attitudes on European integration 
 Attitudes on gays and lesbians 
 Attitudes on racism 
 Contact with people of a different race 
 Effects of immigration on the countries’ culture, crime situation, economy 
 Position on the left/right political spectrum 
 Religiosity 
 
Our analysis of the World Values Survey data works with the following scales 
and data: 
 
 Attitudes on democracy 
 Attitudes on gender equality 
 Background data like age, gender, state of health, feeling of happiness, 
feeling of security 
 Confidence in economic and political institutions 
 Global citizenship 
 Interest in politics 
 Positions on the market economy, like competition, inequality, private 
enterprise 
 What is important in life 
 What is justifiable and what is not justifiable 
 Work ethics 
 Xenophobia 
 
The roll-out of the data, freely downloaded from the WVS website, was: 
G:\Analyses 2016\WVS_Longitudinal_1981_2014_spss_v2015_04_18.sav. 
Again, we took great care in assuring that the variable names reflect the highest 
numerical values in the questionnaire and thus they might differ from the 
original variable label in the WVS.  
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In the following, we shortly present our main research results, which rather 
caution us against the view that the Catholic global rank and file will follow the 
Church’s substantially weakened leadership in endorsing a liberal asylum and 
migration policy. 
 
Result 1: Roman Catholic dominicantes and the Open Society: 13.40% reject 
neighbors of a different religion; 19,60% are openly anti-Semitic, and 48.05% 
are for a tough migration policy 
 
We have made our full results in our Appendix. In this article, we concentrate 
here on the most salient results and on key trends and tendencies, as they emerge 
from the results. In presenting our results, we best should remind our readers 
first that already Almond, 1948, emphasizing the possible contribution of 
Christian democracy to the future of an open society (Popper, 2012), was well 
aware of the challenge of democracy (Almond, 1948; Burns, 1990; Corrin, 
2002; Coughlin, 2003; Glahe and Vorhies, 1989; Philpott, 2004; Sigmund, 
1987).  
 
According to our results, the “real existing” global Catholicism, which emerges 
from our data25 and our distillation of the available surveys today can best be 
described by the following main tendencies: 
 
 WVS data cover 937,2 million Catholics, 84% of the global Roman 
Catholic population. Dominicantes constitute only 45% of the population-
weighted total of Roman Catholics on earth. 
 
 The top 10 Catholic superpowers are the Catholic communities of 
Mexico; Brazil; Philippines; United States; Italy; Poland; Colombia; 
Nigeria; India; and Peru (in descending order of size) which in between 
them share more than 70% of global dominicantes. Cross-checking with 
recent surveys of global anti-Semitism (Tausch, 2015), it emerges that the 
political cultures of the Catholic superpowers Poland; Colombia and Peru 
are plagued by a rate of more than 30% of anti-Semitism each. 
 
 Catholicism in the Arab world i.e. in Algeria; Comoros; Egypt; Iraq; 
Jordan; Kuwait; Lebanon; Libya; Mauritania; Morocco; Palestinian 
Territories; Sudan; Syria; Tunisia; Yemen amounts to 8,7 million 
Catholics. Catholic samples from the World Values Survey are too small 
to draw any reliable conclusions for the multivariate analysis undertaken 
here. 
 
                                                          
25 http://www.catholic-hierarchy.org/country/sc1.html 
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 Inglehart is right in emphasizing the close connection between the 
religious factor and the level of a country’s socio-economic development. 
The overwhelming strength of still existing Catholic activism is to be 
found in the global South, while the developed countries are strongly 
affected by secularization (Map 1a and Map 1b and Graph 1; GDP per 
capita figures are from Tausch & Heshmati, 2013): 
 
Map 1a: Dominicantes in % of all Catholics – the percentages 
 
 
 
Highest: Nigeria; Tanzania; El Salvador; Ghana; Zimbabwe 
Lowest: Finland; Sweden; Netherlands; France; Latvia 
 
Graph 1: GDP per capita and Catholic religious service attendance rate 
 
-8,11 to 2,90
2,90 to 13,91
13,91 to 24,93
24,93 to 35,94
35,94 to 46,95
46,95 to 57,96
57,96 to 68,98
68,98 to 79,99
79,99 to 91,00
91,00 or more
source: our own calculations and http://www.clearlyandsimply.com/
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The Catholic communities in Singapore; Malaysia; El Salvador; United States; 
and Poland are most connected to the Church irrespective of the levels of the 
GDP per capita. Judging from their Church attendance rates, they best withered 
the storms of secularization, while the Catholic communities in the three post-
communist countries Moldova; Albania; and Latvia; as well as the Catholic 
communities in Uruguay and Finland have the lowest Church attendance rates 
irrespective of their GDP per capita. 
 
Map 1b: Where the Catholic Church withered the trends of secularization 
and where it did not: dominicantes in % of all Catholics – the residuals 
from Graph 1 
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Highest: Singapore; Malaysia; El Salvador; United States; Poland 
Lowest: Moldova; Albania; Latvia; Uruguay; Finland 
 
 The strategic importance of the ten Catholic practicing communities with 
still more than 10 million regular weekly religious service attenders living 
in Mexico; Brazil; Philippines; United States; Italy; Poland; Colombia; 
Nigeria; India; and Peru, and making up 70% of global active Catholicism 
cannot be underestimated under any circumstances. Support for a free and 
democratic society in global Catholicism depends increasingly on the 
support for a free and democratic society received among these strategic 
Catholic communities (see Table 1): they will decide the future of global 
Catholicism. 
 
 
Table 1: Where the dominicantes live 
 
 absolute 
number 
dominicantes 
share of 
global 
practicing 
catholics in % 
Mexico 66,6322 15,7795 
Brazil 57,5966 13,6397 
Philippines 43,1010 10,2069 
United States 29,7903 7,0548 
-60,96 to -48,86
-48,86 to -36,75
-36,75 to -24,65
-24,65 to -12,55
-12,55 to -0,45
-0,45 to 11,66
11,66 to 23,76
23,76 to 35,86
35,86 to 47,96
47,96 or more
source: our own calculations and http://www.clearlyandsimply.com/
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Italy 20,4711 4,8478 
Poland 20,2008 4,7838 
Colombia 18,5117 4,3838 
Nigeria 16,2945 3,8588 
India 13,4169 3,1773 
Peru 11,9398 2,8275 
Spain 9,5514 2,2619 
Tanzania 9,2615 2,1933 
Uganda 8,9191 2,1122 
Venezuela 8,3378 1,9745 
Argentina 8,2407 1,9515 
Guatemala 7,3158 1,7325 
Ecuador 5,7805 1,3689 
Germany 5,7327 1,3576 
France 5,3399 1,2646 
Indonesia 4,9516 1,1726 
El Salvador 4,5662 1,0814 
Dominican Rep. 4,0195 0,9519 
Canada 3,8557 0,9131 
Viet Nam 3,6607 0,8669 
Rwanda 3,4800 0,8241 
Chile 2,9977 0,7099 
Zambia 2,4078 0,5702 
Ghana 2,2443 0,5315 
Ukraine 2,0303 0,4808 
South Korea 1,9478 0,4613 
Great Britain 1,8621 0,4410 
South Africa 1,8358 0,4347 
Slovakia 1,7108 0,4051 
Puerto Rico 1,5786 0,3738 
Burkina Faso 1,2576 0,2978 
Australia 1,2102 0,2866 
Lebanon 1,0677 0,2528 
Zimbabwe 1,0474 0,2480 
Hungary 1,0356 0,2452 
Croatia 1,0325 0,2445 
Romania 0,9900 0,2344 
Switzerland 0,7806 0,1849 
Czech Rep. 0,6616 0,1567 
Malaysia 0,5880 0,1392 
Netherlands 0,5244 0,1242 
Lithuania 0,4675 0,1107 
Slovenia 0,4236 0,1003 
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Uruguay 0,3936 0,0932 
Belarus 0,3152 0,0746 
Bosnia 0,2533 0,0600 
Singapore 0,1200 0,0284 
Japan 0,1130 0,0268 
New Zealand 0,1042 0,0247 
Serbia and Montenegro 0,1039 0,0246 
Taiwan 0,0758 0,0179 
Latvia 0,0563 0,0133 
Albania 0,0470 0,0111 
Sweden 0,0134 0,0032 
Moldova 0,0045 0,0011 
Estonia 0,0013 0,0003 
Finland 0,0002 0,0001 
 422,2716 100,0000 
 
 Rejecting Jewish neighbors is 19,60% of all dominicantes in Albania; 
Argentina; Belarus; Bosnia; Canada; Chile; Czech Rep.; India; Japan; 
Mexico; Moldova; Nigeria; Slovakia; South Africa; South Korea; Spain; 
Uganda; United States; Uruguay; Venezuela; and Zimbabwe which 
represent 41.77 % of all the dominicantes in the WVS project. Catholic 
anti-Semitism (Jikeli and Allouche-Benayoun, 2012; Kertzer, 2007; 
Michael, 2008; Rosenfeld, 2013; von Bieberstein, 1977; Wistrich, 2010; 
for further comparative studies on the subject of anti-Semitism see Anti-
Defamation League (ADL), 2014; Bauer, 1993; Bea, 1966; Lebl, 2010, 
2013, 2014a, 2014b; Mansur, 2015; Tausch, 2014; Tibi, 2007, 2012, 
2013a, 2013b, 2015; Wippermann, 1983; Wistrich, 2004, 2007, 2010) as 
manifested in the rejection of even a Jewish neighbor is thus a continuing 
problem, which also affects more than a fifth of the key active Catholic 
communities in Nigeria and Mexico (Table 2). Cross-checking the recent 
ADL figures on global anti-Semitism with the World Values Survey data 
(see Tausch, 2014), we arrive at the stunning overall conclusion that some 
of the following countries with a rate of more than 30% dominicantes also 
have more than 30% anti-Semites: Lebanon; Malaysia; South-Korea; 
Indonesia; Poland; Dominican Republic; Colombia; South Africa; 
Ukraine; Peru; Belarus; Guatemala; Romania; Bosnia and Herzegovina; 
and Venezuela. Of course, the ADL data, as they were published, do not 
allow a real cross-reference with religious service attendance rates, but 
they indicate a certain danger that the widely existing anti-Semitism in 
these countries also affects Catholic publics, the clergy, and possibly even 
the bishops or Cardinals from those countries. So, policymakers, political 
strategists, think tanks, diplomats, journalists, and future conclave 
watchers should be alerted about this constellation 
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Table 2: Catholic anti-Semitism according to World Values Survey data 
 
 % dominicantes rejecting 
Jewish neighbors 
South Korea 40% 
South Africa 38% 
Slovakia 37% 
Nigeria 35% 
Bosnia 30% 
Venezuela 30% 
Spain 27% 
Uganda 24% 
Albania 24% 
Mexico 23% 
Zimbabwe 17% 
Czech Rep. 14% 
Uruguay 13% 
Chile 13% 
Belarus 12% 
India 8% 
Canada 7% 
United States 6% 
Argentina 6% 
 
 Population-weighted results for key opinions of global dominicantes 
are: rejecting people of a different religion: 13,40 % of all 
dominicantes based on surveys in covering 91.94 % of all dominicantes 
who were respondents of the WVS in Albania; Argentina; Australia; 
Belarus; Bosnia; Brazil; Burkina Faso; Canada; Chile; Colombia; Croatia; 
Ecuador; El Salvador; Estonia; Finland; France; Germany; Ghana; Great 
Britain; Hungary; India; Indonesia; Italy; Latvia; Lebanon; Malaysia; 
Mexico; Moldova; Netherlands; New Zealand; Nigeria; Peru; Philippines; 
Poland; Romania; Rwanda; Serbia and Montenegro; Singapore; Slovenia; 
South Africa; South Korea; Spain; Sweden; Switzerland; Taiwan; 
Ukraine; United States; Uruguay; Venezuela; Viet Nam; Zambia; 
Zimbabwe. 
 
 For strict limits + prevent people from coming in migration policy: 
48,05 % of all dominicantes in Albania; Argentina; Australia; Belarus; 
Bosnia; Brazil; Burkina Faso; Canada; Chile; Croatia; Czech Rep.; 
Dominican Rep.; Estonia; Finland; Germany; Ghana; Guatemala; 
Hungary; India; Indonesia; Italy; Japan; Latvia; Lithuania; Malaysia; 
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Mexico; Moldova; New Zealand; Nigeria; Peru; Philippines; Poland; 
Puerto Rico; Romania; Rwanda; Serbia and Montenegro; Singapore; 
Slovakia; Slovenia; South Africa; South Korea; Spain; Sweden; 
Switzerland; Taiwan; Tanzania; Uganda; Ukraine; United States; 
Uruguay; Venezuela; Viet Nam; Zambia; and Zimbabwe which represent 
91.08 % of all dominicantes in the WVS project. 
 
Result 2: European Catholics are not the forefront of European tolerance. 
Evidence, based on the European Social Survey 
 
Our Appendix Tables 1, 2 and 3 and Appendix Graphs 1-8 now portray the 
results of our first factor analytical investigation. Our first factor analytical 
model, based on European Social Survey data, explains 59.41% of the total 
variance. It combines background variables about education and religiosity or a 
secular life style with variables of trust and attitudes on migration. The trust 
variables also contain items on European integration and European institutions. 
 
Our Appendix data (Appendix Table 2) show the factor loadings after the 
promax rotation of principal components, which explain the underlying 
correlation matrix between the variables. We show how we interpret the results 
in terms of the processes “trust”, “xenophobia”, “secularism”, and “European 
anti-racism”. We also document the strong correlation between these dimensions 
(Appendix Table 3). They all correspond to the theoretical expectations, 
confirming the close relationship between the pro-immigration sentiments, 
Euro-multiculturalism, the rejection of racism, personal multicultural experience 
and the rejection of right-wing culturalism. It should be emphasized that – as 
closely interrelated these factors are – they correspond to different dimensions.  
 
The factors (loadings of more than 10% variance in common) are now the 
following: 
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Anti-immigration 
 
0,879  Allow only few or no immigrants of different race/ethnic group 
from majority 
0,862  Allow only few or no immigrants from poorer countries in Europe 
0,858  Allow only few or no immigrants from poorer countries outside 
Europe 
0,829  Allow no Muslims to come and live in country 
0,803  Allow only few or no immigrants of same race/ethnic group as 
majority 
0,779  Allow no Gypsies to come and live in country 
0,767  Allow no Jewish people to come and live in country 
-0,587 Immigration good for country's economy 
-0,562 Country's cultural life enriched by immigrants 
 
secularism  
 
0,864  How often pray apart at religious services (never) 
-0,854 How religious are you 
0,837  How often attend religious services apart from special occasions 
(never) 
-0,387 Disagree: Gays and lesbians free to live life as they wish 
 
Euro-multiculturalism  
 
0,725  Country's cultural life enriched by immigrants 
0,695  Immigration good for country's economy 
0,634  Immigrants make country’s crime problems better 
0,617  European Union: European unification must go further 
0,528  Different race or ethnic group: contact good 
-0,483 Allow only few or no immigrants of different race/ethnic group 
from majority 
-0,459 Allow no Muslims to come and live in country 
-0,447 Allow only few or no immigrants from poorer countries outside 
Europe 
-0,446 Allow only few or no immigrants from poorer countries in Europe 
-0,433 Allow no Gypsies to come and live in country 
-0,389 Allow only few or no immigrants of same race/ethnic group as 
majority 
0,352  Law against ethnic discrimination in workplace good for a country 
-0,347 Allow no Jewish people to come and live in country 
 
reject racism  
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0,748  Reject: some races or ethnic groups: born less intelligent 
0,698  Reject: some races or ethnic groups: born harder working 
-0,479 Disagree: Gays and lesbians free to live life as they wish 
-0,419 Allow no Gypsies to come and live in country 
-0,412 Allow no Muslims to come and live in country 
0,408  Law against ethnic discrimination in workplace good for a country 
-0,332 Allow only few or no immigrants from poorer countries outside 
Europe 
0,323  Country's cultural life enriched by immigrants 
0,322  Cultures: all equal 
-0,319 Allow only few or no immigrants of different race/ethnic group 
from majority 
 
no personal multicultural experience  
 
0,723  Different race or ethnic group: no close friends 
-0,710 Different race or ethnic group: frequent contact 
-0,561 Different race or ethnic group: contact good 
0,401  Allow no Muslims to come and live in country 
-0,375 Law against ethnic discrimination in workplace good for a country 
0,360  Allow no Gypsies to come and live in country 
-0,323 Country's cultural life enriched by immigrants 
 
right-wing culturalism  
 
0,616  Placement on left right scale (right) 
-0,591 Cultures: all equal 
0,349  Law against ethnic discrimination in workplace good for a country 
 
Judging from the correlations between the factors, “secularism” does not play a 
major role in determining trust, xenophobia, and European anti-racism mainly 
because European Churches and religious denominations, just like overall 
society, are deeply split on the issues under scrutiny here. Secularism, defined 
by a high factor loading with never participating in religious services, not being 
religious, and agreeing that gays and lesbians are free to live life as they wish, 
diminishes anti-immigration sentiment to the tune of a factor loading of only -
0,112; it only slightly reduces racism (0,157) and is only slightly negatively 
related to the lack of personal multicultural experience (-0,104) (see Appendix 
Table 8).  
 
But based on criteria that include pro-immigration attitudes, Euro-
multiculturalism, the rejection of racism, personal multicultural experience, and 
the rejection of right-wing culturalism, it is fair to suggest that the following 
Catholic dominicantes political cultures are the most-liberal and the most anti-
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liberal to be encountered in Europe (see Table 3, here below). The Index of 
voter liberalism is an Eigenvalue-weighted combination of the five factor 
analytical dimensions: 
 
 Pro-immigration 
 Euro-multiculturalism 
 reject racism 
 personal multicultural experience 
 no right-wing culturalism 
 
Table 3: Voter Liberalism in Europe 
 
Country Voter Liberalism 
Index - total 
population 
Voter Liberalism 
Index - Catholic 
dominicantes 
Voter Liberalism 
of Roman Catholic 
dominicantes 
compared to the 
total population 
Belgium -1,6669 -2,3102 -0,6433 
Austria -1,7220 -2,7882 -1,0662 
Poland -1,3291 -2,4404 -1,1112 
France -0,5685 -1,8634 -1,2949 
Germany 3,0722 1,6273 -1,4449 
Ireland -2,0655 -4,0909 -2,0254 
Switzerland 0,0201 -2,5012 -2,5214 
Slovenia 0,2321 -3,6861 -3,9182 
 
In not a single European country, practicing Catholics were more liberal in their 
attitudes than overall society. Only in Germany, there was any relevant active 
Catholic support for liberal attitudes, as measured by our index, while 
opposition to them was especially strong in Ireland, Slovenia and Austria. In 
other words, active Catholic publics in Europe could be open to the “populist 
virus” just as their fellow Roman Catholics in the November 8, 2016 election in 
the United States of America. 
 
Table 4: Liberal Catholicism in Europe 
 
Country Voter Liberalism Index - Catholic 
dominicantes 
Germany 1,6273 
France -1,8634 
Belgium -2,3102 
Poland -2,4404 
Switzerland -2,5012 
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Austria -2,7882 
Slovenia -3,6861 
Ireland -4,0909 
 
The factor scores for the Index components are: 
 
Table 5: European general publics 
 
Country Pro-
immigrat
ion 
Euro-
multicult
uralism 
reject 
racism 
personal 
multicult
ural 
experienc
e 
no right-
wing 
culturalis
m 
Voter 
Liberalis
m Index 
Austria -1,236 -0,595 -0,166 -0,109 0,385 -1,722 
Belgium -1,534 -0,162 -0,085 0,051 0,064 -1,667 
France -0,892 0,014 -0,011 0,099 0,222 -0,568 
Germany 2,753 0,101 0,002 0,057 0,159 3,072 
Ireland -1,700 -0,021 -0,177 -0,031 -0,137 -2,065 
Poland -1,023 0,461 -0,203 -0,765 0,201 -1,329 
Slovenia -0,219 0,046 -0,202 0,027 0,580 0,232 
Switzerland 0,111 0,030 -0,344 0,123 0,100 0,020 
 
Table 6: European Catholic dominicantes 
 
Country Pro-
immigrat
ion 
Euro-
multicult
uralism 
reject 
racism 
personal 
multicult
ural 
experienc
e 
no right-
wing 
culturalis
m 
Voter 
Liberalis
m Index 
Austria -1,967 -0,616 -0,125 -0,424 0,343 -2,788 
Belgium -1,406 0,021 -0,312 -0,724 0,111 -2,310 
France -1,046 -0,232 -0,354 -0,139 -0,093 -1,863 
Germany 2,065 0,104 -0,159 -0,328 -0,054 1,627 
Ireland -2,864 -0,181 -0,480 -0,338 -0,227 -4,091 
Poland -1,655 0,279 -0,288 -0,926 0,150 -2,440 
Slovenia -2,690 -0,122 -0,644 -0,388 0,158 -3,686 
Switzerland -1,373 -0,073 -0,561 -0,592 0,098 -2,501 
 
Reasons of space do not permit us to debate here some more results about the 
factors of tolerance in different European countries, presented in this work’s 
appendix tables (Appendix Graph 1 to Appendix Graph 8). The interested public 
will perhaps find the country to country results above and in the Appendix 
Tables as a useful tool to compare the commitment of the Catholic dominicantes 
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and the general populations for an open and tolerant immigration policy in the 
European countries for which we have data available. 
 
Result 3: The global evidence based on the World Values Survey indicate 
that only in a limited number of countries, Catholic dominicantes are at the 
forefront of a democratic, open society 
 
Our somewhat pessimistic European analysis in many ways is reflected also in 
our global analysis. Appendix Tables 4 to 10 as well as the choropleth maps 
Appendix Map 7 to 41 highlight the results. Limited publication space dictates 
that we highlight here only the most salient results. 
 
Our analysis of the World Values Survey data derived the following factor 
analytical scales, well compatible with a large social scientific literature: 
 
1. The non-violent and law-abiding society (Tyler and Darley, 1999) 
2. Democracy movement (Huntington, 1993) 
3. Climate of personal non-violence (APA, 1993) 
4. Trust in institutions (Alesina and Ferrara, 2000; Fukuyama, 1995) 
5. Happiness, good health (Post, 2005) 
6. No redistributive religious fundamentalism (Huntington, 2000) 
7. Accepting the market economy (Elzinga, 1999; Glahe and Vorhies, 1989; 
Hayek, 2012; Novak, 1991) 
8. Feminism (Ferber and Nelson, 2009) 
9. Involvement in politics (Lipset, 1959) 
10. Optimism and engagement (Oishi et al., 1999) 
11. No welfare mentality, acceptancy of the Calvinist work ethics (Giorgi and 
Marsh, 1990) 
 
We mention here briefly the salient factor loadings, explaining 10% or more of a 
variable: 
 
The violent and lawless society 
 
0,796 Justifiable: avoiding a fare on public transport 
0,765 Justifiable: Stealing property 
0,760 Justifiable: claiming government benefits 
0,732 Justifiable: someone accepting a bribe 
0,560 Justifiable: Violence against other people 
0,451 Justifiable: For a man to beat his wife 
 
Democracy movement  
 
Democracy: Civil rights protect people’s liberty against oppression. 0,753 
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Democracy: People choose their leaders in free elections. 0,738 
Democracy: Women have the same rights as men. 0,704 
Democracy: Governments tax the rich and subsidize the poor. 0,493 
Importance of democracy 0,493 
Democracy: The state makes people's incomes equal 0,448 
 
Climate of personal violence  
 
Justifiable: For a man to beat his wife 0,846 
Justifiable: Parents beating children 0,795 
Justifiable: Violence against other people 0,786 
Justifiable: someone accepting a bribe 0,604 
Justifiable: Stealing property 0,587 
 
Lack of trust in institutions  
 
No confidence: The Government 0,776 
No confidence: The Police 0,717 
No confidence: The Press 0,715 
No confidence: The United Nations 0,637 
 
Unhappiness, poor health  
 
State of health (bad) (subjective) 0,771 
Feeling of unhappiness 0,716 
Age 0,440 
I don’t see myself as a world citizen 0,405 
Insecurity in neighborhood 0,364 
 
Redistributive religious fundamentalism  
 
Democracy: Religious authorities interpret the laws. 0,687 
not important in life: Religion -0,596 
Democracy: The state makes people's incomes equal 0,460 
Democracy: Governments tax the rich and subsidize the poor 0,389 
 
Rejecting the market economy  
Competition [good or] harmful 0,760 
Hard work does not bring success 0,733 
[Private vs] state ownership of business 0,353 
 
Feminism  
 
Reject: men make better political leaders than women do 0,717 
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University is not more important for a boy than for a girl 0,682 
Gender (female) 0,555 
 
Distance to politics  
 
No interest in politics 0,849 
not important in life: Politics 0,837 
 
Nihilism  
 
not important in life: Friends 0,690 
not important in life: Leisure time 0,669 
not important in life: Work 0,495 
not important in life: Family 0,478 
 
Welfare mentality, rejection of the Calvinist work ethics  
 
Supporting larger income differences -0,677 
not important in life: Work 0,467 
not important in life: Religion 0,400 
Democracy: The state makes people's incomes equal 0,395 
 
Our Index construction was based on the following weighting of our factor 
scores: 
 
1. The non-violent and law-abiding society   [The violent and 
lawless society -4,263] 
2. Democracy movement      2,574 
3. Climate of personal non-violence    [Climate of personal 
violence -2,260] 
4. Trust in institutions      [Lack of trust in 
institutions -1,929] 
5. Happiness, good health      [Unhappiness, poor 
health -1,864] 
6. No redistributive religious fundamentalism   [Redistributive 
religious fundamentalism -1,554] 
7. Accepting the market economy    [Rejecting the market 
economy -1,434] 
8. Feminism        1,245 
9. Involvement in politics     [Distance to politics -
1,197] 
10. Optimism and engagement     [Nihilism -1,141] 
11. No welfare mentality, acceptancy of the Calvinist work ethics [Welfare 
mentality, rejection of the Calvinist work ethics -1,075] 
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This yielded the Appendix Maps 7-41, based on the factor scores, documented 
in our statistical appendix, as well as the following summarizing maps with a 
brief synopsis of the main results (Map 2 to 4, here below): 
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Map 2: Overall Civil Society Index 
 
 
 
Best: Sweden; Trinidad and Tobago; Australia; Japan; Netherlands 
Worst: India; South Africa; Philippines; Lebanon; Russia 
 
-12,69 to -10,50
-10,50 to -8,30
-8,30 to -6,11
-6,11 to -3,92
-3,92 to -1,73
-1,73 to 0,47
0,47 to 2,66
2,66 to 4,85
4,85 to 7,05
7,05 or more
source: our own calculations and http://www.clearlyandsimply.com/
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Map 3: Overall Catholic Civil Society Index 
 
 
 
Best: Trinidad and Tobago; Ghana; Australia; Germany; United States 
Worst: South Africa; Philippines; Lebanon; Belarus; Peru 
 
-13,05 to -10,73
-10,73 to -8,42
-8,42 to -6,10
-6,10 to -3,79
-3,79 to -1,48
-1,48 to 0,84
0,84 to 3,15
3,15 to 5,47
5,47 to 7,78
7,78 or more
source: our own calculations and http://www.clearlyandsimply.com/
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Map 4: Catholicism – Light-house of the world or democratic deficits? (Data from Map 2 and 3 compared) 
 
 
 
Best: Ukraine; Ghana; Trinidad and Tobago; Chile; Lebanon 
Worst: South Africa; Spain; Peru; Belarus; Slovenia 
-1,43 to -1,04
-1,04 to -0,65
-0,65 to -0,27
-0,27 to 0,12
0,12 to 0,51
0,51 to 0,89
0,89 to 1,28
1,28 to 1,67
1,67 to 2,06
2,06 or more
source: our own calculations and http://www.clearlyandsimply.com/
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In our text Table 7, we also now mention the vital difference ratios between the 
active Catholic Communities and overall society. So, what is the main result of 
our comparative research endeavor, based on the World Values Survey data? 
Only the active Catholic publics in the Ukraine; Ghana; Trinidad and Tobago; 
Chile; Lebanon; Germany; Colombia; Brazil; Mexico; Ecuador; Rwanda; United 
States; Poland; and the Philippines were more committed to the goals of an 
overall democratic civil society than the respective overall country population, 
while in several countries, most dramatically in South Africa, Spain and Peru, 
active Catholic publics had to be considered as less supportive of a democratic 
civil society than the general publics of their countries: 
 
Table 7: The successful and less successful Catholic Civil Societies on a 
global scale 
 
Country/region Overall Civil 
Society Index 
- 
Dominicantes 
Overall Civil 
Society Index 
Catholicism - 
Light House of 
Civil Society? 
Ukraine -1,005 -3,06 2,055 
Ghana 6,808 4,76 2,048 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
7,783 5,751 2,032 
Chile 2,596 1,312 1,284 
Lebanon -4,381 -5,183 0,801 
Germany 5,004 4,274 0,730 
Colombia 1,327 0,631 0,696 
Brazil 2,419 1,752 0,667 
Mexico -0,728 -0,947 0,220 
Ecuador 1,061 0,945 0,116 
Rwanda 0,511 0,402 0,109 
United States 3,294 3,197 0,097 
Poland 2,89 2,802 0,088 
Philippines -5,763 -5,774 0,011 
Singapore -1,621 -1,482 -0,139 
Australia 5,325 5,487 -0,162 
Argentina 0,006 0,342 -0,336 
Nigeria -0,334 0,042 -0,375 
Zimbabwe 1,402 1,789 -0,387 
South Korea 1,421 1,906 -0,485 
Slovenia 0,067 0,73 -0,663 
Belarus -3,46 -2,711 -0,749 
Peru -1,829 -0,931 -0,898 
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Spain 2,159 3,197 -1,039 
South Africa -10,733 -9,691 -1,042 
 
Box 1 and Box 2 highlight the results in the form of a checklist for international 
political and denominational decision makers: 
 
 
Box 1: Value Development 
Surplus/Deficit of practicing Catholics 
vis-à-vis total society: a well-meant 
advice for the Roman Catholic bishops: 
where Catholicism indeed was the salt of 
the earth 
 
The non-violent and law-abiding society: 
Germany; Chile; Spain 
 
Democracy movement: Ukraine; Lebanon; 
Nigeria 
 
Climate of personal non-violence: Trinidad 
and Tobago; Lebanon; Ukraine 
 
Trust in institutions: Chile; Germany; 
Belarus 
 
Happiness and good health: Ghana; United 
States; Ukraine 
 
No redistributive religious 
fundamentalism: Ghana; Rwanda; 
Zimbabwe 
 
Accepting the market economy: Australia; 
Ukraine; Spain 
 
Feminism: Belarus; Trinidad and Tobago; 
Nigeria 
 
Involvement in politics: Belarus; Ukraine; 
Germany 
 
Optimism and engagement: Trinidad and 
Tobago; Ghana; South Korea 
 
No welfare mentality, acceptancy of the 
Calvinist work ethics: Australia; United 
States; Ukraine 
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Box 2: A checklist of weaknesses of 
Open Society values of Roman Catholic 
dominicantes vis-à-vis the rest of society 
 
Argentina: No redistributive religious 
fundamentalism; Optimism and 
engagement; Democracy movement; 
Happiness, good health; No welfare 
mentality, acceptancy of the Calvinist 
work ethics; Accepting the market 
economy 
 
Australia: No redistributive religious 
fundamentalism; Democracy movement; 
Optimism and engagement; Trust in 
institutions; Happiness, good health; 
Climate of personal non-violence 
 
Belarus: No redistributive religious 
fundamentalism; Happiness, good health; 
Democracy movement; Climate of 
personal non-violence; Optimism and 
engagement 
 
Brazil: No redistributive religious 
fundamentalism; Democracy movement; 
Happiness, good health; Optimism and 
engagement 
 
Chile: Happiness, good health; No 
redistributive religious fundamentalism; 
Optimism and engagement; Climate of 
personal non-violence 
 
Colombia: No redistributive religious 
fundamentalism; Democracy movement; 
Happiness, good health 
 
Ecuador: Happiness, good health; 
Democracy movement; No redistributive 
religious fundamentalism; No welfare 
mentality, acceptancy of the Calvinist 
work ethics; Optimism and engagement; 
Accepting the market economy 
 
Germany: No redistributive religious 
fundamentalism; Happiness, good health; 
Optimism and engagement; Democracy 
movement; Feminism 
 
Ghana: no deficits 
 
Lebanon: Involvement in politics; No 
redistributive religious fundamentalism; 
Happiness, good health; No welfare 
mentality, acceptancy of the Calvinist 
work ethics; The non-violent and law-
abiding society 
 
Mexico: No redistributive religious 
fundamentalism; Happiness, good health; 
Climate of personal non-violence; 
Optimism and engagement; Democracy 
movement 
 
Nigeria: Climate of personal non-violence; 
The non-violent and law-abiding society; 
Involvement in politics; No welfare 
mentality, acceptancy of the Calvinist 
work ethics; Optimism and engagement; 
No redistributive religious fundamentalism 
 
Peru: Climate of personal non-violence; 
No redistributive religious 
fundamentalism; Democracy movement; 
The non-violent and law-abiding society; 
Accepting the market economy; 
Happiness, good health 
 
Philippines: No redistributive religious 
fundamentalism; Climate of personal non-
violence; Accepting the market economy; 
Democracy movement; No welfare 
mentality, acceptancy of the Calvinist 
work ethics; Involvement in politics 
 
Poland: No redistributive religious 
fundamentalism; Happiness, good health; 
Democracy movement; Accepting the 
market economy 
 
Rwanda: Democracy movement; The non-
violent and law-abiding society; Climate of 
personal non-violence 
 
Singapore: Democracy movement; 
Feminism; No redistributive religious 
fundamentalism; Happiness, good health; 
Trust in institutions 
 
Slovenia: No redistributive religious 
fundamentalism; Happiness, good health; 
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Trust in institutions; Democracy 
movement 
 
South Africa: The non-violent and law-
abiding society; Climate of personal non-
violence; No redistributive religious 
fundamentalism; Accepting the market 
economy; No welfare mentality, 
acceptancy of the Calvinist work ethics; 
Optimism and engagement; Democracy 
movement; Happiness, good health 
 
South Korea: No redistributive religious 
fundamentalism; Democracy movement; 
Climate of personal non-violence; The 
non-violent and law-abiding society; No 
welfare mentality, acceptancy of the 
Calvinist work ethics 
 
Spain: No redistributive religious 
fundamentalism; Happiness, good health; 
Democracy movement; Optimism and 
engagement; Climate of personal non-
violence 
 
Trinidad and Tobago: No redistributive 
religious fundamentalism; No welfare 
mentality, acceptancy of the Calvinist 
work ethics; Accepting the market 
economy 
 
Ukraine: Optimism and engagement; 
Trust in institutions; No redistributive 
religious fundamentalism 
 
United States: The non-violent and law-
abiding society; Democracy movement; 
Climate of personal non-violence 
 
Zimbabwe: Climate of personal non-
violence; No welfare mentality, acceptancy 
of the Calvinist work ethics; Optimism and 
engagement; Democracy movement; 
Accepting the market economy; The non-
violent and law-abiding society; Feminism 
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Result 4: What the world can learn from the Vatican Council (1958 – 1963): 
the legacy of Post Vatican II tolerance by global comparison 
 
Our overall assessment, however, produces not only pessimistic results. One of 
our hypotheses is that the Roman Catholic Second Vatican Council and its 
commitment to inter-religious tolerance (see Bea, 1966; Connelly, 2012; 
D’Costa, 2014; Heschel, 1966; Kimelman, 2004; Valkenberg and Cirelli, 2016) 
in many ways paved the way for the high degree of societal tolerance in 
predominantly Catholic Western countries over many decades, irrespective of 
the fact whether Catholics in those countries live a secular or a more religious 
life. Let us recall here the declaration “Nostra aetate” of the Second Vatican 
Council, which has become the main pillar of the evolving Catholic global 
interreligious dialogue, honored, among others by the United States Conference 
of Catholic Bishops. 26 
 
“Nostra aetate” indeed explicitly praises 27 the spiritual values of Hinduism and 
Buddhism, and adds: 
 
Likewise, other religions found everywhere try to counter the restlessness of the 
human heart, each in its own manner, by proposing "ways," comprising 
teachings, rules of life, and sacred rites. The Catholic Church rejects nothing 
that is true and holy in these religions. She regards with sincere reverence those 
ways of conduct and of life, those precepts and teachings which, though 
differing in many aspects from the ones she holds and sets forth, nonetheless 
often reflect a ray of that Truth which enlightens all men. The Church, therefore, 
exhorts her sons, that through dialogue and collaboration with the followers of 
other religions” 
 
With particular emphasis, Nostra Aetate also mentions Muslims and Islam, and 
stresses what it calls the the bond that spiritually ties the people of the New 
Covenant to Abraham's stock: Since the spiritual patrimony common to 
Christians and Jews is thus so great, this sacred synod wants to foster and 
recommend that mutual understanding and respect which is the fruit, above all, 
of biblical and theological studies as well as of fraternal dialogues. 
Furthermore, in her rejection of every persecution against any man, the Church, 
mindful of the patrimony she shares with the Jews and moved not by political 
reasons but by the Gospel's spiritual love, decries hatred, persecutions, displays 
of anti-Semitism, directed against Jews at any time and by anyone. 
 
                                                          
26 http://www.usccb.org/beliefs-and-teachings/ecumenical-and-interreligious/index.cfm 
27 http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-
ii_decl_19651028_nostra-aetate_en.html 
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[…] No foundation therefore remains for any theory or practice that leads to 
discrimination between man and man or people and people, so far as their 
human dignity and the rights flowing from it are concerned. 
 
The Church reproves, as foreign to the mind of Christ, any discrimination 
against men or harassment of them because of their race, color, condition of 
life, or religion. On the contrary, following in the footsteps of the holy Apostles 
Peter and Paul, this sacred synod ardently implores the Christian faithful to 
"maintain good fellowship among the nations" (1 Peter 2:12), and, if possible, 
to live for their part in peace with all men, so that they may truly be sons of the 
Father who is in heaven. 
 
The empirical analysis of global tolerance, based on promax factor analysis, 
using the three most salient xenophobia items from the WVS data base, comes 
to the following results (Table 8 and Map 5, further results see our data 
appendix). Our model explains 63,502 % of total variance and is based on 
191620 representative global citizens, reaffirming the prevalence of tolerance in 
many predominantly Catholic countries: 
 
Table 8: Global tolerance, xenophobia and racism 
 
 Xenophobia and racism 
Neighbors: People of a 
different race 
0,817 
Neighbors: Immigrants/foreign 
workers 
0,778 
Neighbors: People of a 
different religion 
0,795 
 
The factor scores are to be found in Appendix Table 5, which yield the 
following Map: 
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Map 5: Factor scores for xenophobia and racism (national averages) 
 
 
 
Best: Argentina; Andorra; Sweden; Canada; New Zealand 
Worst: Libya; Palestinian Occupied Territories; Azerbaijan; Bangladesh; India 
 
-0,78 to -0,58
-0,58 to -0,37
-0,37 to -0,16
-0,16 to 0,05
0,05 to 0,26
0,26 to 0,47
0,47 to 0,68
0,68 to 0,88
0,88 to 1,09
1,09 or more
source: our own calculations and http://www.clearlyandsimply.com/
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Today, predominantly Catholic countries are among the best placed countries in 
the world in avoiding rejecting people of a different race, immigrants/foreign 
workers and people of a different religion as neighbors. Here, Pope Francis’ 
home country Argentina is even the best practice of the entire globe in this 
context. According to the global denominations, we are presented with the 
following results: 
 
Table 9: Xenophobia and racism in the world system according to religious 
denomination 
 
Religious denomination Mean N Std. Deviation 
Shia 0,600 2670 1,131 
Hindu 0,534 5422 1,187 
Armenian Apostolic 
Church 
0,448 1033 1,077 
Muslim 0,296 43623 1,130 
Buddhist 0,257 6635 1,078 
Orthodox -0,019 24266 0,979 
Protestant -0,197 14338 0,844 
No religious denomination -0,223 33658 0,830 
Roman Catholic -0,257 34462 0,823 
 
In the next round of answers to our research question, we also constructed a kind 
of “UNDP Index” of the civic culture of global society by international 
comparison with the existing data, 28 selecting the WVS items on the civic culture 
of tolerance, accepting gender equality, secularization and non-violence. Our 
index weights the variables equally. According to the UNDP Index methodology, 
for each country the worst value of a given variable is subtracted from the 
observed country value of a given variable. This resulting number is then divided 
by the difference between the best and the worst value among the entire group of 
countries of the variable in question, yielding component indices ranging from 0 
(worst performance) to 1 (best performance). The resulting overall index – in our 
case the Index of a Democratic Civil Society – is nothing but the average of the 
six chosen components: 29 
 
 Important child qualities: tolerance and respect for other people 
 accepting neighbors: People of a different religion 
 men do not make better political leaders than women do 
 University is equally important for a boy and for a girl 
 democracy: religious authorities should not interpret the laws. 
 unjustifiable: For a man to beat his wife 
                                                          
28 WVS_Longitudinal_1981_2014_MULTIVAR_spss_v2015_04_20.sav 
29 http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi 
48 
 
 
In constructing the index, we took particular care to select variables with a 
maximum country coverage in the vast World Values Survey data base in order to 
achieve not only a substantial depth of the index, but also a very wide 
geographical coverage across nations and cultures. The original WVS items were 
used in the following fashion in the construction of the UNDP type of indicator. 
The detailed research results are to be seen in our statistical appendix, and it 
suffices here to recall the Index methodology in Table 10 and our overall results 
in Map 6: 
 
Table 10: Towards a UNDP type of Index of the global democratic civil 
society 
 
Country/region maximum minimum worst 
value 
best value 
Important child qualities: 
tolerance and respect for 
other people 
0,900 0,360 0,360 0,900 
neighbors: People of a 
different religion  
0,570 0,010 0,570 0,010 
men make better political 
leaders than women do 
3,430 1,500 1,500 3,430 
University is more 
important for a boy than 
for a girl 
3,700 2,300 2,300 3,700 
Democracy: religious 
authorities should 
interpret the laws. 
7,830 1,800 7,830 1,800 
justifiable: For a man to 
beat his wife 
4,820 1,160 4,820 1,160 
 
The country results for this procedure are the following: Sweden, Norway and 
Andorra are the countries best combining the civic culture of tolerance, accepting 
gender equality, secularization and non-violence, while the three worst placed 
nations on earth are Mali, Bahrein and Yemen. All Muslim countries in our 77 
countries and territories with full data which were under investigation here were 
below the global average; and the best placed Muslim country is post-Soviet 
Kazakhstan; and the best placed Arab country is Qatar. While some Arab 
countries might perform, here and there, in a rather surprising and positive 
fashion, it is especially the combination of the six dimensions, where the Arab 
world really fails: 
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Map 6: UNDP-type Index of a democratic civil society 
 
 
Best: Sweden, Norway, Andorra, Netherlands, Switzerland 
Worst: Mali, Bahrain, Yemen, India, Algeria 
 
0,26
0,35
0,44
0,52
0,61
0,70
0,79
0,87
0,96
1,05
source: our ow n calculations and http://w w w .clearlyandsimply.com/clearly_and_simply/2009/06/choropleth-maps-w ith-excel.html
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Considering the evidence which emerges from the data, Egyptian President 
Abdel-Fattah el-Sisi 30 was right to say at the World Economic Forum in Davos, 
2015, that  
 
[…] Muslims need to adapt their religious discourse to the present and 
eliminate elements of their rhetoric that could foster violence. “Islam is a 
tolerant religion, but this wasn’t always clear to the rest of the world during the 
last 20 or 30 years,” Sisi said during a speech at the World Economic Forum in 
Davos, Switzerland. “The terrible terrorist attacks and this terrible image of 
Muslims led us to think that we must stop and think and change the religious 
discourse and remove from it things that have led to violence and extremism.” 
 
“There can be no religious discourse which is in conflict with its environment 
and with the world,” Sisi continued. “And therefore, we Muslims need to modify 
this religious discourse. And this has nothing to do with conviction and with 
religious beliefs, because those are immutable. But we need a new discourse 
that will be adapted to a new world and which will remove some of the 
misconceptions.” 
 
[…] Speaking to a group of Muslim clerics at al-Azhar University in Cairo 
earlier this month, Sisi struck a similar tone, saying Islam needed a “religious 
revolution” and calling on clerics to take the lead. “We are in need of a 
religious revolution. You imams are responsible before Allah,” he said. “The 
entire world is waiting for your word ... because the Islamic world is being torn, 
it is being destroyed, it is being lost … by our own hands.” 
 
In response to these comments, rare for a Muslim head of state, some have 
speculated that Sisi may be aiming to reform Islam as a sort of “Muslim Martin 
Luther.” 31 
 
Precisely the Second Vatican Council provided the Roman Catholic Church with 
the theoretical tools to leave behind the centuries of anti-Semitism and 
intolerance which are too well-known in history (Jikeli and Allouche-Benayoun, 
2012; Kertzer, 2007; Michael, 2008; Rosenfeld, 2013; von Bieberstein, 1977; 
Wistrich, 2010; see also Bauer, 1993; Wistrich, 2004, 2007, 2010).  
 
Reasons of space do not permit us to debate here some more results about the 
trajectories of tolerance of different world religious cultures and their presumed 
correlates, presented in this work’s appendix tables.  
                                                          
30 http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/06/sisi-calls-religious-reforms-extremists-
160629181523576.html and http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/01/22/sisi-muslims-
adapt_n_6508808.html 
31 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/01/22/sisi-muslims-adapt_n_6508808.html 
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Appendix Table 10 compares the population-unweighted tolerance indicators 
(factor scores) for the different global numerically major denominations 
according to levels of religious service attendance rates. Appendix Tables 11 to 
14 highlight the correlations between the indicators, presented in this work, with 
overall social and political country indicators and highlight the close correlations 
between them in the direction of confirming the relationship between value 
development and an open society. The graph series in Appendix Graph 9 
underlines the trajectories of “modernization”, and human security, measured by 
the GDP per capita (natural logarithm) and the factor scores achieved in our 
research endeavor. We show that most often, value development is a curve-
linear function of development. In each graph, it is clearly visible whether at 
different stages of socio-economic development, practicing Roman Catholics 
achieve higher or lower country factor scores in their value development curves 
than general populations and Muslim populations.  
 
Conclusions and policy perspectives 
 
We have reached the end of our empirical journey to the worlds of Roman 
Catholicism around the globe. Our main population-weighted global research 
results rather caution us against the view that the Catholic global rank and file 
will follow the Church’s substantially weakened leadership in endorsing a 
liberal asylum and migration policy. 13.40% of Roman Catholic dominicantes 
reject neighbors of a different religion; 19,60% are openly anti-Semitic as 
defined by the admittedly limited and restrictive World Values Survey item 
about rejecting to have a Jewish neighbor (six decades after the Second Vatican 
Council), and 48.05% are for a tough migration policy. Dominicantes constitute 
only 45% of the population-weighted total of Roman Catholics on earth. The top 
10 Catholic superpowers are the Catholic communities of Mexico; Brazil; 
Philippines; United States; Italy; Poland; Colombia; Nigeria; India; and Peru (in 
descending order of size) which in between them share more than 70% of global 
dominicantes. We emphasize in this essay that the American sociologist Ronald 
Inglehart is right in underlining the close connection between the religious factor 
and the level of a country’s socio-economic development.  
 
Based on European Social Survey-based criteria that include pro-immigration 
attitudes, Euro-multiculturalism, the rejection of racism, personal multicultural 
experience, and the rejection of right-wing culturalism, it is fair to suggest that 
in not a single European country, practicing Catholics were more liberal in their 
attitudes towards immigration than overall society.  
 
The global country-based evidence based on the World Values Survey also 
indicates that only in a limited number of countries, Catholic dominicantes are at 
the forefront of a democratic, open society, based on eleven factor analytical 
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criteria, well compatible with the theoretical literature. The best performing 
Roman Catholic dominicantes communities were to be found in Trinidad and 
Tobago; Ghana; Australia; Germany; and the United States, while the worst 
performances were recorded in South Africa; Philippines; Lebanon; Belarus; 
and Peru. We also document the vital difference ratios between the active 
Catholic and overall society. Only the active Catholic publics in the Ukraine; 
Ghana; Trinidad and Tobago; Chile; Lebanon; Germany; Colombia; Brazil; 
Mexico; Ecuador; Rwanda; United States; Poland; and the Philippines were 
more committed to the goals of an overall democratic civil society than the 
general populations of these countries, while in several countries, most 
dramatically in South Africa, Spain and Peru, active Catholic publics had to be 
considered as less supportive of a democratic civil society than the general 
publics of their countries. 
 
Our overall assessment, underlined the importance of the Roman Catholic 
Second Vatican Council and its commitment to inter-religious tolerance 
reaffirming the prevalence of tolerance in many predominantly Catholic 
countries, such as Argentina; Andorra; Sweden; Canada; and New Zealand. 
Considering the poor performance of predominantly Muslim countries 
combining the civic culture of tolerance, accepting gender equality, 
secularization and non-violence, we concluded that Egyptian President Abdel-
Fattah el-Sisi was right to say that Muslims need to adapt their religious 
discourse to the present and eliminate elements of their rhetoric that could foster 
violence. Precisely the Second Vatican Council provided the Roman Catholic 
Church with the theoretical tools to leave behind the centuries of anti-Semitism 
and intolerance which are too well-known in history. 
 
In Graph 4 below, we now summarize the trajectories of global value 
development, as they emerge from our data: at lower levels of socio-economic 
development, active Roman Catholicism indeed is a countervailing force of 
humanizing societies, but it fails to influence developments at higher “stages of 
development”: 
 
Graph 4: value development in global society, as predicted by our data and 
GDP per capita32 
 
                                                          
32 For the GDP per capita data, see Tausch & Heshmati, 2013. 
53 
 
 
 
In Table 13, below, we also show the different indicators for the major 
denominational groups in the United States of America. By far, Judaism is at the 
forefront of the positive value developments, our work and its indicators attempt 
to capture. Unfortunately, Roman Catholicism in the United States still lags 
behind Judaism and Protestantism concerning its value development of its rank 
and file, but still, the overall value development indicator is higher than that of 
the average of United States society. 
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Table 13: Values in the United States of America by denomination 
 
 Jewish Protestant Roman 
Catholic 
Total Other No religious 
denomination 
The non-violent and law-abiding 
society 
1,032 2,393 0,487 0,880 0,995 -0,058 
Democracy movement 1,056 0,019 -0,162 -0,089 -0,713 0,091 
Climate of personal non-violence 0,430 0,378 0,441 0,310 0,491 0,100 
Trust in institutions -0,152 -0,593 -0,182 -0,492 -0,682 -0,580 
Happiness, good health 0,605 0,069 0,168 0,117 0,065 0,102 
No redistributive religious 
fundamentalism 
1,933 1,325 1,103 1,304 0,546 1,771 
Accepting the market economy 0,450 0,902 0,480 0,421 0,515 -0,005 
Feminism 0,978 0,589 0,763 0,669 0,680 0,633 
Involvement in politics 0,895 0,674 0,392 0,346 0,273 0,095 
Optimism and engagement 0,083 0,081 0,051 0,005 0,123 -0,158 
No welfare mentality, acceptancy of the 
Calvinist work ethics 
-0,038 -0,094 -0,059 -0,178 -0,062 -0,384 
Overall Value Development Index 7,273 5,741 3,481 3,294 2,231 1,608 
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At the end of this essay, we would like to emphasize as well that progressive 
Catholicism – both in the Vatican and in the general secretariat of the United 
Nations - would be well advised to come to terms with the real challenge which 
Islamist terrorism poses for humanity. Let us document this with a lengthier 
quotation from Pope Francis I and what we feel is his very deficient explanation 
of terrorism which in no way considers the ideological trajectory of Islamism 
from the days of Sayid Qutb (Qutb and David, 2006; Qutb, 1990, 2000; Qutb et 
al., 1979): 
 
Pope Francis surprised reporters on a flight from Krakow to the Vatican late 
Sunday when he blamed the “god of money” for extremist violence in Europe 
and the Middle East, saying that a ruthless global economy leads 
disenfranchised people to violence. 
 
“Terrorism grows when there is no other option, and as long as the world 
economy has at its center the god of money and not the person,” the pope told 
reporters, according to the Wall Street Journal. “This is fundamental terrorism, 
against all humanity.” 
 
The pope was responding to a journalist’s question about whether there is a link 
between Islam and terrorism, particularly focusing on the fatal attack on a 
priest by Muslim extremists in France last week. 
 
“I ask myself how many young people that we Europeans have left devoid of 
ideals, who do not have work. Then they turn to drugs and alcohol or enlist in 
[the Islamic State, or ISIS],” he said, Reuters reports. 
 
The pope said that no religion has a monopoly on violence, the Wall Street 
Journal notes: 
 
His own experience in interreligious dialogue had shown him that Muslims seek 
“peace and encounter,” he said. “It is not right and it is not just to say that 
Islam is terroristic.” And he said no religion had a monopoly on violent 
members. 
 
“If I speak of Islamic violence, I should speak of Catholic violence. Not all 
Muslims are violent, not all Catholics are violent,” Pope Francis said, 
dismissing Islamic State as a “small fundamentalist group” not representative 
of Islam as a whole. 
 
“In almost all religions there is always a small group of fundamentalists,” even 
in the Catholic Church, the pope said, though not necessarily physically violent. 
“One can kill with the tongue as well as the knife.” 
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The remarks followed similar comments made last Wednesday, when Pope 
Francis argued that the current Middle East conflicts are wars over economic 
and political interests—not religion or so-called “Islamic terrorism.” 
 
“There is war for money,” he said on Wednesday, according to the Wall Street 
Journal. “There is war for natural resources. There is war for the domination of 
peoples. Some might think I am speaking of religious war. No. All religions want 
peace; it is other people who want war.”33 
 
Naiveté will not be sufficient to confront the situation of the two trains of 
extremism in the West now about to collide, about which Rabbi Pinchas 
Goldschmidt was speaking recently to the European Parliament. Islamist anti-
Semitism and extremism is a new form and a continuation of the hatred and 
radicalism which culminated in the Shoah, and Roman Catholics should be 
aware of it and should defend democracy against the new radicalisms, 
threatening the West. 
 
 
 
                                                          
33 https://canadiandimension.com/articles/view/pope-francis-capitalism-is-terrorism-against-
all-of-humanity 
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Appendix Table 1: The Evidence emerging from the European Social Survey. Eigenvalues and percentages of explained variance 
 
 
Component Initial Eigenvalues   
 Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
Anti-immigration 6,495 28,241 28,241 
secularism 2,373 10,320 38,560 
Euro-multiculturalism 1,336 5,808 44,368 
reject racism 1,264 5,497 49,865 
no personal multicultural experience 1,192 5,181 55,047 
right-wing culturalism 1,004 4,364 59,411 
 
Appendix Table 2: Factor analytical model of European right wing extremism – the factor loadings 
 
 Anti-immigration secularism Euro-
multiculturalism 
reject racism no personal 
multicultural 
experience 
right-wing 
culturalism 
Placement on left right scale (right) 0,255 -0,154 -0,076 -0,086 0,198 0,616 
Disagree: Gays and lesbians free to live life as 
they wish 
0,307 -0,387 -0,192 -0,479 0,294 -0,269 
European Union: European unification must 
go further 
-0,292 0,047 0,617 0,150 -0,072 0,036 
Allow only few or no immigrants of same 
race/ethnic group as majority 
0,803 -0,061 -0,389 -0,185 0,206 0,012 
Allow only few or no immigrants of different 
race/ethnic group from majority 
0,879 -0,090 -0,483 -0,319 0,312 0,056 
Allow only few or no immigrants from poorer 
countries in Europe 
0,862 -0,058 -0,446 -0,285 0,263 0,060 
Allow only few or no immigrants from poorer 
countries outside Europe 
0,858 -0,067 -0,447 -0,332 0,299 0,078 
Immigration good for country's economy -0,587 -0,003 0,695 0,240 -0,234 0,033 
Country's cultural life enriched by immigrants -0,562 0,045 0,725 0,323 -0,323 0,018 
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How religious are you 0,063 -0,854 0,048 -0,077 0,042 0,020 
How often attend religious services apart 
from special occasions (never) 
-0,062 0,837 -0,019 0,119 -0,093 0,011 
How often pray apart at religious services 
(never) 
-0,060 0,864 -0,006 0,087 -0,029 0,000 
Immigrants make country’s crime problems 
better 
-0,283 -0,053 0,634 0,105 -0,087 -0,232 
Law against ethnic discrimination in 
workplace good for a country 
-0,218 0,056 0,352 0,408 -0,375 0,349 
Different race or ethnic group: no close 
friends 
0,211 0,026 -0,189 -0,065 0,723 0,123 
Different race or ethnic group: frequent 
contact 
-0,216 0,138 0,018 0,163 -0,710 0,081 
Different race or ethnic group: contact good -0,223 -0,038 0,528 0,193 -0,561 0,031 
Reject: some races or ethnic groups: born less 
intelligent 
-0,238 0,028 0,179 0,748 -0,124 -0,025 
Reject: some races or ethnic groups: born 
harder working 
-0,207 0,102 0,126 0,698 -0,083 -0,151 
Cultures: all equal -0,110 -0,038 0,300 0,322 -0,048 -0,591 
Allow no Jewish people to come and live in 
country 
0,767 -0,059 -0,347 -0,287 0,274 -0,044 
Allow no Muslims to come and live in 
country 
0,829 -0,119 -0,459 -0,412 0,401 0,074 
Allow no Gypsies to come and live in country 0,779 -0,105 -0,433 -0,419 0,360 0,138 
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Appendix Table 3: Factor analytical model of European right wing extremism – the correlation between the factors 
 
Component Anti-immigration secularism Euro-
multiculturalism 
reject racism no personal 
multicultural 
experience 
right-wing 
culturalism 
Anti-immigration 1,000 -0,112 -0,504 -0,371 0,357 0,041 
secularism -0,112 1,000 -0,022 0,157 -0,104 0,053 
Euro-multiculturalism -0,504 -0,022 1,000 0,342 -0,314 -0,013 
reject racism -0,371 0,157 0,342 1,000 -0,296 0,042 
no personal multicultural experience 0,357 -0,104 -0,314 -0,296 1,000 -0,088 
right-wing culturalism 0,041 0,053 -0,013 0,042 -0,088 1,000 
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Appendix Graph 1: voter liberalism and its components in Austria 
 
 
 
Appendix Graph 2: voter liberalism and its components in Belgium 
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Appendix Graph 3: voter liberalism and its components in France 
 
 
 
Appendix Graph 4: voter liberalism and its components in Germany 
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Appendix Graph 5: voter liberalism and its components in Ireland 
 
 
 
Appendix Graph 6: voter liberalism and its components in Poland 
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Appendix Graph 7: voter liberalism and its components in Slovenia 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix Graph 8: voter liberalism and its components in Switzerland 
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Appendix Table 4: The global frame of reference based on the World Values Survey: Eigenvalues and percentages of explained variance 
 
 Factor Eigenvalue % of Variance 
explained 
Cumulative % 
The violent and lawless society 1,000 4,263 10,931 10,931 
Democracy movement 2,000 2,574 6,601 17,532 
Climate of personal violence 3,000 2,260 5,794 23,326 
Lack of trust in institutions 4,000 1,929 4,947 28,273 
Unhappiness, poor health 5,000 1,864 4,779 33,052 
Redistributive religious fundamentalism 6,000 1,554 3,986 37,037 
Rejecting the market economy 7,000 1,434 3,676 40,714 
Feminism 8,000 1,245 3,193 43,907 
Distance to politics 9,000 1,197 3,070 46,977 
Nihilism 10,000 1,141 2,926 49,904 
Welfare mentality, rejection of the Calvinist work 
ethics 
11,000 1,075 2,756 52,660 
[The tolerance and security of the elderly 12,000 1,049 2,690 55,350] 
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Appendix Table 5: The global model – factor loadings 
 
 The violent 
and lawless 
society 
Democracy 
movement 
Climate of 
personal 
violence 
Lack of trust 
in 
institutions 
Unhappiness, 
poor health 
Redistributiv
e religious 
fundamentali
sm 
Rejecting the 
market 
economy 
not important in life: Family 0,096 -0,031 0,057 -0,002 0,000 -0,287 0,245 
not important in life: Friends 0,105 -0,056 -0,029 0,085 0,128 -0,023 0,034 
not important in life: Leisure time -0,021 -0,079 0,091 0,024 0,154 0,088 0,025 
not important in life: Politics -0,015 0,009 -0,049 0,148 0,035 -0,088 0,067 
not important in life: Work -0,023 -0,038 0,065 -0,001 0,165 -0,191 0,314 
not important in life: Religion 0,051 0,199 -0,094 0,007 0,034 -0,596 0,265 
Feeling of unhappiness -0,029 0,045 0,038 0,153 0,716 0,000 0,043 
State of health (bad) (subjective) 0,049 0,000 -0,086 0,043 0,771 0,033 0,093 
Important child qualities: tolerance and respect for other 
people 
-0,014 0,075 -0,113 0,013 0,057 -0,009 -0,120 
Reject neighbors: People who speak a different language 0,153 -0,179 -0,009 0,015 0,026 0,175 0,011 
Reject: men make better political leaders than women do 0,043 0,105 -0,156 0,047 -0,054 -0,302 0,046 
University is not more important for a boy than for a girl -0,129 0,195 -0,147 0,077 0,014 -0,219 -0,114 
No interest in politics 0,018 -0,042 -0,051 0,108 0,043 0,019 0,027 
Supporting larger income differences 0,003 -0,084 0,066 -0,026 -0,119 0,010 -0,023 
[Private vs] state ownership of business 0,070 0,073 -0,056 -0,047 0,181 0,281 0,353 
Competition [good or] harmful 0,200 -0,134 0,095 -0,047 -0,006 0,060 0,760 
Hard work does not bring success 0,133 -0,068 0,072 0,027 0,026 -0,066 0,733 
No confidence: The Press -0,046 0,047 -0,038 0,715 0,082 -0,100 -0,035 
No confidence: The Police 0,081 0,000 -0,035 0,717 0,093 -0,009 0,019 
No confidence: The Government 0,030 0,030 -0,060 0,776 0,101 -0,095 -0,031 
No confidence: The United Nations -0,089 -0,061 0,095 0,637 0,140 0,090 0,007 
Democracy: Governments tax the rich and subsidize the 
poor. 
0,028 0,493 -0,094 -0,018 0,085 0,389 0,178 
Democracy: Religious authorities interpret the laws. 0,146 -0,002 0,139 -0,037 -0,030 0,687 0,093 
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Democracy: People choose their leaders in free 
elections. 
-0,189 0,738 -0,139 0,040 0,053 -0,020 -0,155 
Democracy: Civil rights protect people’s liberty against 
oppression. 
-0,128 0,753 -0,106 0,020 0,035 0,026 -0,045 
Democracy: Women have the same rights as men. -0,075 0,704 -0,211 -0,036 -0,029 -0,055 -0,044 
Democracy: The state makes people's incomes equal 0,088 0,448 -0,036 -0,061 0,068 0,460 0,197 
Importance of democracy -0,153 0,493 -0,186 -0,060 -0,010 -0,091 -0,208 
Justifiable: claiming government benefits 0,760 -0,101 0,229 -0,019 -0,014 0,083 0,143 
Justifiable: Stealing property 0,765 -0,209 0,587 -0,036 -0,055 0,096 0,228 
Justifiable: Parents beating children 0,212 -0,112 0,795 -0,011 -0,051 0,111 -0,003 
Justifiable: Violence against other people 0,560 -0,181 0,786 -0,006 -0,048 0,023 0,179 
Justifiable: avoiding a fare on public transport 0,796 -0,097 0,300 0,022 -0,024 0,039 0,166 
Justifiable: someone accepting a bribe 0,732 -0,195 0,604 -0,027 -0,056 0,068 0,211 
Justifiable: For a man to beat his wife 0,451 -0,172 0,846 -0,019 -0,023 0,111 0,134 
I don’t see myself as a world citizen -0,106 0,016 0,104 0,178 0,405 -0,150 0,059 
Insecurity in neighborhood 0,150 -0,047 -0,047 0,161 0,364 0,080 -0,052 
Gender (female) -0,040 -0,097 -0,017 -0,062 0,095 0,303 0,061 
Age -0,113 0,062 -0,146 -0,071 0,440 -0,069 0,080 
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Appendix Table 5 (continued) 
 
 Feminism Distance to 
politics 
Nihilism Welfare 
mentality, 
rejection of 
the Calvinist 
work ethics 
not important in life: Family -0,147 -0,028 0,478 0,212 
not important in life: Friends 0,047 0,129 0,690 -0,025 
not important in life: Leisure time -0,091 0,080 0,669 0,068 
not important in life: Politics 0,065 0,837 0,236 0,125 
not important in life: Work 0,005 0,092 0,495 0,467 
not important in life: Religion 0,072 0,155 0,216 0,400 
Feeling of unhappiness -0,082 0,044 0,139 0,084 
State of health (bad) (subjective) 0,074 0,005 0,201 0,135 
Important child qualities: tolerance and respect for other people 0,146 0,052 -0,080 -0,127 
Reject neighbors: People who speak a different language -0,250 -0,024 0,136 0,070 
Reject: men make better political leaders than women do 0,717 0,039 0,023 0,079 
University is not more important for a boy than for a girl 0,682 0,055 -0,085 -0,071 
No interest in politics 0,103 0,849 0,019 0,021 
Supporting larger income differences -0,045 -0,029 -0,001 -0,677 
[Private vs] state ownership of business -0,006 0,014 0,024 -0,309 
Competition [good or] harmful -0,002 0,011 0,118 0,102 
Hard work does not bring success -0,037 0,034 0,053 0,084 
No confidence: The Press 0,069 0,133 0,038 -0,012 
No confidence: The Police 0,062 0,105 0,042 -0,020 
No confidence: The Government 0,074 0,129 0,014 0,018 
No confidence: The United Nations -0,127 0,072 0,033 0,041 
Democracy: Governments tax the rich and subsidize the poor. -0,125 0,057 0,027 0,235 
Democracy: Religious authorities interpret the laws. -0,215 -0,001 0,039 0,034 
Democracy: People choose their leaders in free elections. 0,071 -0,004 -0,102 -0,040 
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Democracy: Civil rights protect people’s liberty against 
oppression. 
0,024 -0,006 -0,073 0,080 
Democracy: Women have the same rights as men. 0,255 0,014 -0,060 0,093 
Democracy: The state makes people's incomes equal -0,138 0,089 0,006 0,395 
Importance of democracy 0,143 -0,145 -0,142 -0,269 
Justifiable: claiming government benefits -0,069 0,023 0,061 0,034 
Justifiable: Stealing property -0,100 -0,062 0,102 0,082 
Justifiable: Parents beating children -0,108 -0,020 0,002 -0,057 
Justifiable: Violence against other people -0,118 -0,068 0,087 0,066 
Justifiable: avoiding a fare on public transport -0,031 0,023 0,057 0,069 
Justifiable: someone accepting a bribe -0,104 -0,044 0,102 0,078 
Justifiable: For a man to beat his wife -0,189 -0,079 0,064 0,057 
I don’t see myself as a world citizen -0,123 0,174 0,041 0,128 
Insecurity in neighborhood 0,120 0,034 0,074 -0,045 
Gender (female) 0,555 0,160 0,051 0,078 
Age 0,087 -0,208 0,218 0,193 
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Appendix Table 6: Correlation matrix of components at the global level. Correlations greater than or equal to +-.100 
 
Component The 
violent 
and 
lawless 
society 
democrac
y 
movemen
t 
climate of 
personal 
violence 
lack of 
trust in 
institutio
ns 
unhappin
ess, poor 
health 
redistrib
utive 
religious 
fundame
ntalism 
rejecting 
the 
market 
economy 
feminism distance 
to politics 
nihilism 
democracy movement -0,139          
climate of personal violence 0,405 -0,225         
lack of trust in institutions           
unhappiness, poor health    0,138       
redistributive religious 
fundamentalism 
          
rejecting the market economy 0,236  0,125        
feminism   -0,201   -0,120     
distance to politics    0,161       
nihilism 0,105    0,198 -0,100 0,261  0,101  
welfare mentality, rejection of the 
Calvinist work ethics 
 0,120   0,103  0,324 -0,101 0,108 0,295 
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Appendix Table 7: The overall development of civil society on a global scale – factor scores 
 
 
 Overall Civil 
Society Index 
The non-
violent and 
law-abiding 
society 
Democracy 
movement 
Climate of 
personal 
non-violence 
Trust in 
institutions 
Happiness, 
good health 
No 
redistributiv
e religious 
fundamentali
sm 
Accepting 
the market 
economy 
Sweden 7,047 0,163 1,741 0,704 0,457 0,429 2,001 -0,080 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
5,751 1,802 -0,199 0,166 -0,559 0,524 0,568 1,169 
Australia 5,487 1,104 0,908 0,872 -0,121 0,304 1,810 0,158 
Japan 5,466 1,479 0,383 1,245 0,403 -0,443 1,689 -0,032 
Netherlands 5,216 1,878 1,219 0,839 -0,075 -0,109 1,860 -0,726 
Ghana 4,760 1,918 -0,586 -0,476 0,724 1,094 -0,271 1,041 
Germany 4,274 1,583 1,551 0,504 0,286 -0,108 1,480 -0,535 
Uzbekistan 4,250 0,561 1,106 -0,059 3,009 0,681 -0,698 0,388 
Qatar 3,749 1,775 -1,095 -0,149 1,738 1,267 -1,121 0,032 
Cyprus 3,500 1,295 0,493 0,929 -0,419 0,080 0,528 0,014 
Uruguay 3,496 0,632 0,712 1,024 0,140 0,017 1,016 -0,578 
Spain 3,197 0,606 1,545 1,217 -0,415 0,049 0,917 -0,357 
United States 3,197 0,837 -0,105 0,292 -0,490 0,110 1,300 0,418 
Romania 2,920 1,685 1,026 1,081 -0,757 -0,714 0,263 0,464 
Poland 2,802 0,574 1,012 1,086 -0,622 -0,084 0,485 -0,458 
Taiwan 2,745 0,446 1,552 -0,269 -0,151 0,295 0,759 0,229 
Georgia 2,562 2,544 -0,350 0,876 -0,768 -1,114 0,153 0,337 
Thailand 2,523 0,490 0,310 0,989 0,298 0,388 -0,519 -0,240 
Turkey 2,121 1,819 0,692 1,001 0,367 -0,004 -0,920 -0,280 
South Korea 1,906 -0,190 0,175 1,222 0,377 -0,328 0,484 -0,074 
Armenia 1,852 1,377 0,607 0,984 -0,657 -0,579 -0,246 0,288 
Zimbabwe 1,789 0,554 -0,284 -1,172 0,094 0,393 0,021 0,782 
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Brazil 1,752 0,314 0,110 0,389 -0,734 0,119 0,356 0,382 
Tunisia 1,656 2,181 0,369 -0,134 -1,449 0,033 -0,538 0,893 
China 1,514 -0,177 1,264 -0,442 1,632 0,047 1,001 -0,452 
Chile 1,312 -0,335 1,179 1,587 0,006 -0,556 0,168 -0,332 
Estonia 1,157 -0,197 1,538 1,077 0,398 -0,952 0,707 -0,498 
Malaysia 1,029 -0,709 0,043 0,082 1,027 0,793 -1,104 0,352 
Ecuador 0,945 -0,890 -0,625 1,127 -0,153 0,597 -0,466 0,410 
Slovenia 0,730 0,545 1,027 0,745 -1,054 -0,206 1,237 -0,405 
Colombia 0,631 -0,538 -0,506 0,740 -0,345 0,587 0,092 0,091 
Rwanda 0,402 2,179 -0,507 -2,507 0,456 1,056 -0,172 0,109 
Argentina 0,342 -0,406 0,576 0,945 -0,793 -0,174 0,564 -0,350 
Morocco 0,249 1,168 1,003 0,032 -0,332 0,423 -1,076 0,071 
Jordan 0,199 2,463 -0,761 0,156 -0,202 -0,132 -1,047 0,233 
Libya 0,079 1,138 -0,607 -0,363 -1,206 0,518 -0,896 0,862 
Nigeria 0,042 0,616 -1,068 -0,853 -0,177 1,123 -0,707 0,325 
Total 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 
Yemen -0,205 2,300 0,585 -1,019 -1,615 -0,148 -1,357 1,130 
Azerbaijan -0,301 2,801 -0,338 0,331 0,231 -0,627 0,007 -0,814 
Kazakhstan -0,367 -0,669 0,948 0,254 0,697 -0,458 -0,025 -0,704 
Kuwait -0,840 -0,423 -0,956 -0,264 0,223 0,861 -0,730 0,199 
Peru -0,931 -1,640 -0,185 0,980 -0,990 -0,359 0,198 0,416 
Mexico -0,947 -3,110 -0,442 1,012 -0,796 0,656 -0,037 0,538 
Kyrgyzstan -0,958 -1,065 -0,963 0,594 0,499 0,070 -0,269 0,016 
Pakistan -1,223 1,273 0,302 0,654 -1,108 0,613 -1,738 -0,149 
Singapore -1,482 -0,266 -1,019 -1,241 1,140 0,267 0,195 -0,383 
Hong Kong -1,876 -2,016 0,031 0,181 0,643 -0,467 0,807 -0,351 
Belarus -2,711 -0,558 -0,006 0,536 -0,023 -1,414 0,551 -0,361 
Palestinian 
Occupied 
Territories 
-2,997 0,724 -1,245 -0,618 -0,962 -0,611 -0,736 0,589 
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Ukraine -3,060 -0,630 1,269 0,733 -0,653 -1,526 -0,159 -0,730 
Iraq -3,306 1,105 -0,373 -0,728 -0,794 -0,934 -1,119 0,543 
Egypt -3,878 1,458 0,809 -1,111 -1,273 -3,046 -1,525 0,836 
Algeria -4,422 -2,077 -0,133 -0,866 -0,705 -0,202 -0,413 0,261 
Bahrain -4,426 0,912 -3,032 -0,221 0,989 -0,143 0,405 -1,580 
Russia -4,609 -1,455 0,750 0,676 -0,658 -1,301 0,188 -0,804 
Lebanon -5,183 -1,664 -1,416 -0,551 -1,107 -0,171 0,111 -0,172 
Philippines -5,774 -4,228 -0,695 -1,229 0,965 0,182 -1,184 0,109 
South Africa -9,691 -5,075 -0,757 -2,445 0,186 0,438 -0,961 -0,826 
India -10,498 -4,656 -2,702 -1,989 0,798 0,404 -0,093 -0,489 
 
Appendix Table 7: (continued) 
 
 Overall Civil 
Society Index 
Feminism Involvement in politics Optimism and 
engagement 
No welfare mentality, 
acceptancy of the 
Calvinist work ethics 
Sweden 7,047 0,958 0,503 0,309 -0,138 
Trinidad and Tobago 5,751 1,070 0,004 0,190 1,015 
Australia 5,487 0,708 0,053 0,060 -0,368 
Japan 5,466 0,155 0,824 0,002 -0,240 
Netherlands 5,216 0,669 0,381 -0,252 -0,467 
Ghana 4,760 -0,155 0,033 0,408 1,031 
Germany 4,274 0,350 0,273 -0,290 -0,819 
Uzbekistan 4,250 -0,542 0,006 0,130 -0,332 
Qatar 3,749 -0,526 0,505 0,643 0,681 
Cyprus 3,500 0,528 -0,131 0,467 -0,283 
Uruguay 3,496 0,862 -0,373 0,139 -0,094 
Spain 3,197 0,514 -0,594 0,168 -0,453 
United States 3,197 0,668 0,342 0,002 -0,177 
Romania 2,920 0,329 -0,437 -0,257 0,236 
Poland 2,802 0,396 -0,111 0,140 0,386 
73 
 
Taiwan 2,745 0,312 -0,553 0,157 -0,031 
Georgia 2,562 0,120 -0,114 0,476 0,403 
Thailand 2,523 0,050 0,879 -0,231 0,110 
Turkey 2,121 -0,380 0,086 0,192 -0,453 
South Korea 1,906 0,114 0,016 0,040 0,071 
Armenia 1,852 0,023 -0,321 0,096 0,280 
Zimbabwe 1,789 0,242 0,012 0,263 0,885 
Brazil 1,752 0,701 -0,173 0,074 0,214 
Tunisia 1,656 -0,585 -0,127 0,467 0,547 
China 1,514 -0,202 0,006 -0,304 -0,858 
Chile 1,312 0,484 -0,659 0,141 -0,370 
Estonia 1,157 0,248 -0,381 -0,015 -0,767 
Malaysia 1,029 -0,328 0,147 0,253 0,473 
Ecuador 0,945 0,546 -0,101 0,140 0,362 
Slovenia 0,730 0,509 -0,658 -0,075 -0,935 
Colombia 0,631 0,715 -0,582 0,015 0,363 
Rwanda 0,402 -0,100 0,257 0,238 -0,610 
Argentina 0,342 0,523 -0,295 -0,086 -0,162 
Morocco 0,249 -0,322 -0,463 -0,182 -0,072 
Jordan 0,199 -0,816 -0,390 0,131 0,565 
Libya 0,079 -0,768 0,237 0,538 0,625 
Nigeria 0,042 -0,455 0,181 0,533 0,523 
Total 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 
Yemen -0,205 -0,904 0,076 0,074 0,673 
Azerbaijan -0,301 -0,597 -0,808 -0,286 -0,201 
Kazakhstan -0,367 -0,074 -0,143 0,007 -0,201 
Kuwait -0,840 -0,945 0,521 0,215 0,461 
Peru -0,931 0,789 -0,285 -0,333 0,480 
Mexico -0,947 0,691 -0,235 0,285 0,491 
Kyrgyzstan -0,958 -0,082 0,332 -0,242 0,151 
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Pakistan -1,223 -0,697 -0,233 -0,349 0,209 
Singapore -1,482 0,088 -0,057 0,036 -0,241 
Hong Kong -1,876 0,122 -0,211 -0,268 -0,345 
Belarus -2,711 -0,098 -0,363 -0,319 -0,657 
Palestinian Occupied 
Territories 
-2,997 -0,726 0,144 0,065 0,381 
Ukraine -3,060 0,104 -0,465 -0,203 -0,799 
Iraq -3,306 -0,727 -0,204 -0,134 0,061 
Egypt -3,878 -0,644 0,569 0,027 0,022 
Algeria -4,422 -0,691 -0,139 0,069 0,474 
Bahrain -4,426 -0,868 0,655 -1,284 -0,258 
Russia -4,609 -0,159 -0,515 -0,416 -0,916 
Lebanon -5,183 -0,211 0,216 -0,169 -0,048 
Philippines -5,774 -0,198 0,506 -0,344 0,341 
South Africa -9,691 -0,137 0,158 -0,188 -0,084 
India -10,498 -0,759 0,283 -0,940 -0,354 
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Appendix Table 8: The contribution of Catholic Dominicantes to global civil society – factor scores 
 
 
Country/region Overall Catholic 
Civil Society 
Index 
The non-
violent and 
law-abiding 
society 
Democracy 
movement 
Climate of 
personal non-
violence 
Trust in 
institutions 
Happiness, good 
health 
No 
redistributive 
religious 
fundamentalism 
Accepting the 
market economy 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
7,783 2,333 -0,177 0,682 -0,151 0,637 0,199 1,083 
Ghana 6,808 2,173 -0,555 -0,328 1,031 1,528 -0,094 1,140 
Australia 5,325 1,706 0,283 0,857 -0,361 0,224 0,834 0,652 
Germany 5,004 2,894 1,361 0,698 1,014 -1,048 0,533 -0,288 
United States 3,294 0,235 -0,445 0,157 -0,086 0,450 0,850 0,562 
Poland 2,890 1,121 0,878 1,156 -0,564 -0,315 0,006 -0,507 
Chile 2,596 0,879 1,442 1,524 1,104 -1,344 -0,449 -0,274 
Brazil 2,419 0,707 -0,148 0,699 -0,367 -0,056 -0,082 0,610 
Spain 2,159 1,338 0,655 1,194 -0,071 -0,655 -0,195 0,049 
South Korea 1,421 -0,361 -0,248 1,115 0,797 -0,300 -0,061 -0,030 
Zimbabwe 1,402 0,474 -0,476 -1,499 0,276 0,444 0,082 0,730 
Colombia 1,327 0,105 -0,816 0,802 -0,112 0,502 -0,127 0,112 
Ecuador 1,061 -0,508 -0,874 1,192 0,125 0,363 -0,596 0,387 
Rwanda 0,511 2,079 -0,737 -2,523 0,470 1,218 -0,110 0,161 
Slovenia 0,067 0,624 0,844 0,979 -1,250 -0,610 0,136 -0,271 
Argentina 0,006 0,034 0,296 1,108 -0,516 -0,306 -0,009 -0,371 
Nigeria -0,334 -0,333 -0,684 -1,425 0,340 1,437 -0,719 0,397 
Mexico -0,728 -2,971 -0,469 0,983 -0,616 0,590 -0,352 0,608 
Ukraine -1,005 -0,059 1,927 1,228 -1,333 -1,197 -0,365 -0,251 
Singapore -1,621 -0,060 -1,553 -1,130 1,080 0,174 0,112 -0,318 
Peru -1,829 -2,014 -0,490 0,687 -0,779 -0,452 0,013 0,344 
Belarus -3,460 -0,338 -0,741 0,487 0,694 -2,113 -0,768 -0,333 
Lebanon -4,381 -1,670 -0,799 -0,053 -1,012 -0,270 -0,173 -0,042 
Philippines -5,763 -4,172 -0,727 -1,342 1,058 0,258 -1,314 0,053 
76 
 
South Africa -10,733 -5,941 -0,868 -2,886 0,696 0,432 -1,143 -0,917 
 
 
Appendix Table 8: (continued) 
 
 
Country/region Overall Catholic 
Civil Society Index 
Feminism Involvement in politics Optimism and 
engagement 
No welfare mentality, 
acceptancy of the 
Calvinist work ethics 
Trinidad and Tobago 7,783 1,391 0,288 0,567 0,931 
Ghana 6,808 -0,053 0,086 0,683 1,198 
Australia 5,325 0,779 0,331 -0,136 0,157 
Germany 5,004 0,334 0,646 -0,378 -0,761 
United States 3,294 0,760 0,597 0,071 0,143 
Poland 2,890 0,493 -0,011 0,148 0,486 
Chile 2,596 0,530 -0,481 -0,001 -0,332 
Brazil 2,419 0,876 -0,078 0,031 0,226 
Spain 2,159 0,532 -0,404 0,043 -0,327 
South Korea 1,421 0,146 0,125 0,171 0,065 
Zimbabwe 1,402 0,222 0,223 0,173 0,753 
Colombia 1,327 0,825 -0,506 0,103 0,438 
Ecuador 1,061 0,607 -0,021 0,100 0,288 
Rwanda 0,511 -0,008 0,284 0,286 -0,609 
Slovenia 0,067 0,699 -0,488 0,051 -0,647 
Argentina 0,006 0,550 -0,256 -0,307 -0,219 
Nigeria -0,334 -0,213 0,014 0,469 0,382 
Mexico -0,728 0,837 -0,153 0,273 0,544 
Ukraine -1,005 0,170 -0,004 -0,612 -0,508 
Singapore -1,621 -0,035 0,237 0,082 -0,210 
Peru -1,829 0,918 -0,277 -0,326 0,547 
Belarus -3,460 0,355 0,144 -0,335 -0,513 
Lebanon -4,381 -0,148 -0,041 -0,118 -0,056 
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Philippines -5,763 -0,079 0,503 -0,333 0,334 
South Africa -10,733 0,036 0,227 -0,239 -0,131 
 
Appendix Table 9: factor scores for the global Muslim communities 
 
Country/regi
on 
Overall 
Value 
Developm
ent Index 
The non-
violent and 
law-abiding 
society 
Democrac
y 
movement 
Climate of 
personal 
non-violence 
Trust in 
institutions 
Happines
s, good 
health 
No 
redistributi
ve religious 
fundament
alism 
Accepting 
the market 
economy 
Feminis
m 
Involvem
ent in 
politics 
Optimism 
and 
engagemen
t 
No welfare 
mentality, 
acceptancy 
of the 
Calvinist 
work ethics 
Uzbekistan 4,4448 0,5897 1,1005 -0,0750 3,0913 0,7470 -0,7118 0,4354 -0,5687 0,0061 0,1501 -0,3200 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
3,5438 1,4006 -0,2184 0,1107 -0,8181 0,2823 0,7298 0,8917 0,8342 -0,2126 -0,1598 0,7033 
Cyprus 3,0322 1,2133 -0,0671 0,5499 0,5317 0,3606 0,4672 -0,0711 0,2306 -0,2466 0,5158 -0,4522 
Ghana 3,0148 0,8065 -0,5589 -0,7661 1,1679 1,0465 -0,5219 0,7999 -0,4202 0,0187 0,6082 0,8342 
Turkey 2,1656 1,8680 0,6841 0,9976 0,3960 -0,0034 -0,9346 -0,2724 -0,3843 0,0748 0,1893 -0,4494 
Tunisia 1,6557 2,1814 0,3686 -0,1338 -1,4493 0,0330 -0,5377 0,8926 -0,5851 -0,1275 0,4667 0,5467 
Malaysia 0,8868 -0,7099 0,0029 0,0450 1,1204 0,8449 -1,3641 0,3405 -0,4103 0,2712 0,2611 0,4851 
Germany 0,8106 1,3972 0,4572 -0,4141 -0,1588 0,5370 0,9637 -0,3274 -0,3500 -0,3318 -0,4286 -0,5338 
Kazakhstan 0,7581 -0,4280 1,0511 0,2239 0,9059 -0,1179 -0,1207 -0,5189 -0,1421 -0,1456 0,1260 -0,0755 
Morocco 0,1958 1,1655 0,9888 0,0225 -0,3510 0,4186 -1,0713 0,0751 -0,3278 -0,4619 -0,1906 -0,0720 
Nigeria 0,0844 1,2375 -1,1892 -0,4317 -0,3953 1,1105 -0,9758 0,2235 -0,7021 0,2867 0,4868 0,4335 
Jordan 0,0745 2,4231 -0,7803 0,1422 -0,2189 -0,1198 -1,0527 0,2305 -0,8358 -0,4029 0,1269 0,5622 
Libya 0,0475 1,0995 -0,6165 -0,3388 -1,2184 0,5143 -0,8998 0,8685 -0,7671 0,2465 0,5382 0,6213 
Rwanda -0,0813 1,6592 -1,1284 -2,4547 0,5257 0,7122 -0,2302 0,4797 0,0338 0,3543 0,3963 -0,4293 
Yemen -0,2053 2,3001 0,5847 -1,0192 -1,6148 -0,1480 -1,3566 1,1301 -0,9041 0,0756 0,0742 0,6728 
Azerbaijan -0,2785 2,8039 -0,3700 0,3397 0,2371 -0,6097 -0,0066 -0,7896 -0,6031 -0,8018 -0,2769 -0,2013 
Total -0,3311 0,7046 -0,2166 -0,0833 -0,0143 0,1481 -0,7341 0,1698 -0,5173 -0,0326 0,0799 0,1644 
Kyrgyzstan -0,6871 -0,9541 -0,9637 0,6675 0,5604 0,1388 -0,3077 0,0350 -0,0998 0,3400 -0,2579 0,1543 
Pakistan -1,2295 1,2799 0,2958 0,6577 -1,1099 0,6134 -1,7426 -0,1506 -0,6982 -0,2323 -0,3487 0,2061 
Singapore -1,5741 -0,5476 -0,8864 -1,2478 1,1517 0,6181 -0,3741 -0,1418 0,0616 -0,1852 0,0901 -0,1128 
Palestinian 
Occupied 
Territories 
-2,9809 0,7371 -1,2443 -0,6022 -0,9635 -0,6209 -0,7360 0,5887 -0,7265 0,1425 0,0597 0,3844 
Iraq -3,3331 1,0915 -0,3896 -0,7300 -0,7979 -0,9315 -1,1138 0,5387 -0,7297 -0,1999 -0,1338 0,0629 
78 
 
Algeria -4,4092 -2,0870 -0,1291 -0,8719 -0,7023 -0,2015 -0,4112 0,2649 -0,6954 -0,1320 0,0747 0,4816 
South Africa -6,7246 -3,9332 -1,0075 -1,4029 0,0146 0,7886 -0,9986 0,0137 0,2626 -0,8064 0,0494 0,2952 
Lebanon -7,0308 -2,2564 -1,9024 -0,9477 -0,8255 -0,2253 -0,0429 -0,4131 -0,2808 0,2389 -0,2756 -0,0999 
Russia -8,2049 -2,5526 -1,2311 -0,9286 -0,3026 -0,6068 -0,1567 -0,5965 -0,1536 -0,3835 -0,6129 -0,6800 
Philippines -9,5032 -5,8083 -0,8314 -1,9553 0,8459 0,0670 -1,4667 -0,1284 -0,8214 0,4789 -0,2953 0,4118 
India -10,1415 -4,6626 -2,5096 -2,6408 0,8269 0,5849 -0,1558 -0,5227 -0,8900 0,5430 -0,6064 -0,1086 
 
 
Appendix Table 10: Factor scores for the unweighted World Values Survey averages of the different global denominations, according to their religious activity rate, 
measured by their participation in religious service attendance (completely distant: never attending services; secular: less than once a month; mensuantes: once a 
month or more often) 
 
Religious denomination The non-
violent 
and law-
abiding 
society 
Democra
cy 
movemen
t 
Climate 
of 
personal 
non-
violence 
Trust in 
institutio
ns 
No 
redistrib
utive 
religious 
fundame
ntalism 
Acceptin
g the 
market 
economy 
Feminism Involvem
ent in 
politics 
Optimis
m and 
engageme
nt 
No 
welfare 
mentality
, 
acceptanc
y of the 
Calvinist 
work 
ethics 
Overall 
Value 
Develop
ment 
Index 
Protestant Completely 
distant 
0,8216 0,3146 0,0723 -0,3778 1,5001 0,2080 0,4006 0,2321 -0,2086 -0,2071 2,7557 
Protestant Secular 0,6591 0,1088 -0,1631 0,0045 0,4030 0,4197 0,2211 0,1116 0,0863 0,2284 2,0796 
Roman Catholic Completely 
distant 
0,1898 0,8615 0,8228 -0,5876 1,0565 -0,0743 0,5240 -0,4825 0,0700 -0,3094 2,0708 
Protestant Mensuantes 0,9164 -0,5013 -0,5927 0,1993 -0,1167 0,5765 0,1942 0,0909 0,2537 0,5423 1,5626 
Buddhist Mensuantes 0,3965 -0,1199 0,2891 0,8412 -0,3793 -0,1896 -0,0192 0,5346 -0,0411 0,0033 1,3156 
Buddhist Secular 0,1188 0,1320 0,1288 0,4433 0,2877 -0,0992 0,0983 0,2762 -0,0954 -0,0430 1,2475 
Roman Catholic Secular -0,4022 0,4008 0,4918 -0,2884 0,4719 0,0282 0,4410 -0,1657 -0,0042 -0,0838 0,8893 
Orthodox Mensuantes 0,6350 0,0505 0,5433 -0,1851 -0,2520 0,0043 0,2121 -0,1408 -0,0163 -0,0586 0,7926 
Orthodox Secular 0,1816 0,8073 0,7468 -0,4324 0,2297 -0,2678 0,1721 -0,3751 -0,0353 -0,3453 0,6815 
Muslim Completely 
distant 
0,9186 0,2173 0,1201 0,1583 -0,5078 0,0627 -0,1956 -0,2920 0,0369 0,0113 0,5297 
Muslim Secular 0,5293 -0,1306 -0,0551 0,6380 -0,6268 -0,0358 -0,2947 -0,1691 0,0081 -0,0392 -0,1759 
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Orthodox Completely 
distant 
-0,1935 1,0998 0,7357 -0,2805 0,7032 -0,6171 -0,2423 -0,4239 -0,3381 -0,7158 -0,2725 
Roman Catholic Mensuantes -0,7511 -0,3283 -0,1024 0,0598 -0,2255 0,1798 0,3791 0,0445 0,0677 0,1768 -0,4995 
Buddhist Completely 
distant 
-0,6973 0,1705 -0,4728 0,3562 0,6702 -0,1610 0,1664 -0,1351 -0,1476 -0,3344 -0,5848 
Muslim Mensuantes 0,5172 -0,5407 -0,2742 -0,0693 -0,7004 0,2701 -0,7544 0,1830 0,1347 0,2855 -0,9485 
Hindu Mensuantes -2,9289 -1,6872 -1,1449 0,7792 -0,2541 0,0011 -0,3482 0,1764 -0,5727 -0,1833 -6,1626 
Hindu Completely 
distant 
-3,3066 -1,0029 -1,9986 0,3357 0,2541 -0,7745 -0,5103 -0,0287 -0,5287 -0,2789 -7,8395 
Hindu Secular -3,8632 -2,3223 -1,6013 0,9044 -0,0294 -0,5283 -0,5677 0,1786 -0,6355 -0,1161 -8,5808 
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Appendix Table 11: Pearson Bravais correlation coefficients of standard 
macro-economic and macro-political cross national country data with the 
results of our surveys: the drivers and bottlenecks of Roman Catholic 
Sunday Church attendance rates 
 
 
 Dominicantes 
in % 
R^2 
Annual population growth rate, 1975-
2005 (%) 
0,7825 61,2309 
Human development index (HDI) value 
2004 
-0,7686 59,0812 
tertiary enrollment -0,7437 55,3085 
Combined Failed States Index 0,7137 50,9318 
female survival probability of surviving 
to age 65 female 
-0,6848 46,8903 
Life Expectancy (years) -0,6755 45,6255 
closing educational gender gap -0,6679 44,6027 
Happy life years -0,6329 40,0561 
Global tolerance index -0,6327 40,0278 
ESI-Index Environment Sustainability 
Index (Yale Columbia) 
-0,6276 39,3925 
Civil and Political Liberties violations 0,6227 38,7809 
Rule of law -0,6182 38,2129 
Democracy measure -0,6141 37,7170 
closing of global gender gap overall 
score 2009 
-0,5994 35,9314 
Corruption avoidance measure -0,5621 31,5998 
Life Satisfaction (0-10) -0,5611 31,4782 
comparative price levels (US=1.00) -0,5344 28,5628 
overall 35 development index -0,5276 27,8387 
 
  
81 
 
 
Appendix Table 12: Pearson Bravais correlation coefficients of standard 
macro-economic and macro-political cross national country data with the 
results of our surveys: the drivers and bottlenecks of the development of 
overall civil society 
 
 
 Overall Civil 
Society Index 
R^2 
overall 35 development index -0,5276 27,8387 
gender empowerment index value 0,5154 26,5589 
social security expenditure per GDP 
average 1990s (ILO) 
0,4640 21,5258 
Combined Failed States Index -0,4396 19,3211 
Happy life years 0,4249 18,0528 
Global tolerance index 0,4188 17,5358 
per capita world class universities 0,4128 17,0370 
Muslim population share per total 
population 
-0,4023 16,1838 
Life Satisfaction (0-10) 0,3738 13,9741 
Rule of law 0,3714 13,7902 
Corruption avoidance measure 0,3622 13,1161 
comparative price levels (US=1.00) 0,3601 12,9676 
Life Expectancy (years) 0,3598 12,9462 
Human development index (HDI) value 
2004 
0,3439 11,8288 
Environmental Performance Index (EPI) 0,3205 10,2729 
 
 
Appendix Table 13: Pearson Bravais correlation coefficients of standard 
macro-economic and macro-political cross national country data with the 
results of our surveys: the drivers and bottlenecks of the development of 
Catholic civil society (dominicantes) 
 
 
 Catholic 
Overall Civil 
Society Index 
R^2 
overall 35 development index -0,5276 27,8387 
social security expenditure per GDP 
average 1990s (ILO) 
0,4640 21,5258 
gender empowerment index value 0,4393 19,2954 
Tertiary emigration rate 0,4153 17,2495 
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Rule of law 0,4036 16,2858 
Muslim population share per total 
population 
-0,4023 16,1838 
unemployment rate -0,3851 14,8274 
Global tolerance index 0,3705 13,7250 
Combined Failed States Index -0,3490 12,1791 
Happy life years 0,3367 11,3378 
Life Satisfaction (0-10) 0,3278 10,7469 
 
Appendix Table 14: Pearson Bravais correlation coefficients of standard 
macro-economic and macro-political cross national country data with the 
results of our surveys: the drivers and bottlenecks of the relative advance of 
Roman Catholic civil society (dominicantes) in comparison to overall society 
 
 
 Catholicism 
Light House 
of Civil 
Society? 
R^2 
Tertiary emigration rate 0,6521 42,5193 
overall 35 development index -0,5276 27,8387 
social security expenditure per GDP 
average 1990s (ILO) 
0,4640 21,5258 
Muslim population share per total 
population 
-0,4023 16,1838 
years of membership in EMU, 2010 -0,3448 11,8875 
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Appendix Table 15: Global tolerance, xenophobia and racism 
 
 Xenophobia and racism 
Neighbors: People of a 
different race 
0,817 
Neighbors: Immigrants/foreign 
workers 
0,778 
 
63,502 % of total variance explained 
 
191620 individuals around the globe 
 
Country/region Xenophobia and 
racism 
N Std. 
Deviation 
Argentina -0,575 2032 0,300 
Andorra -0,567 1003 0,389 
Sweden -0,566 2209 0,385 
Canada -0,556 2097 0,405 
New Zealand -0,540 841 0,397 
Trinidad and Tobago -0,540 2001 0,384 
Uruguay -0,534 2000 0,450 
Norway -0,533 1025 0,423 
Brazil -0,516 2986 0,479 
Colombia -0,495 1512 0,488 
Australia -0,478 2898 0,530 
Switzerland -0,471 1241 0,574 
Spain -0,467 2389 0,534 
Great Britain -0,436 1041 0,517 
United States -0,428 3474 0,558 
Chile -0,423 2000 0,632 
Peru -0,385 2710 0,652 
Netherlands -0,375 2952 0,629 
Poland -0,364 1966 0,716 
Zimbabwe -0,350 1499 0,647 
Croatia -0,338 1196 0,672 
Germany -0,313 6125 0,740 
Burkina Faso -0,299 1534 0,776 
Taiwan -0,291 2465 0,702 
Mexico -0,285 3560 0,780 
Italy -0,284 1012 0,827 
Finland -0,265 1014 0,840 
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China -0,251 4291 0,785 
Uzbekistan -0,215 1500 0,795 
Ukraine -0,201 5311 0,845 
Albania -0,199 999 0,821 
Hungary -0,188 996 0,794 
Slovenia -0,179 3113 0,911 
Latvia -0,161 1200 0,789 
Ethiopia -0,159 1500 0,938 
Pakistan -0,137 3200 0,726 
Kazakhstan -0,129 1502 0,790 
Venezuela -0,122 1200 0,967 
Bulgaria -0,115 2073 0,927 
Philippines -0,100 1200 0,901 
Moldova -0,095 2030 0,881 
Serbia and Montenegro -0,067 1220 0,957 
Hong Kong -0,055 1000 1,001 
South Africa -0,052 6458 0,828 
Singapore -0,049 1969 0,795 
Rwanda -0,014 3034 1,116 
Bosnia -0,010 800 1,005 
Russia 0,007 4519 0,945 
Morocco 0,012 2368 0,940 
Qatar 0,015 1060 0,753 
Tunisia 0,033 1205 1,005 
Cyprus 0,038 2025 0,994 
Romania 0,039 4518 1,052 
Ghana 0,053 3086 1,019 
Estonia 0,071 2554 1,012 
Mali 0,084 1534 1,084 
Georgia 0,107 4710 1,052 
Belarus 0,119 1535 1,007 
Nigeria 0,167 3781 1,064 
Zambia 0,216 1500 0,998 
France 0,222 1001 1,150 
Algeria 0,254 2482 1,040 
Japan 0,289 2443 1,131 
Iran 0,302 5195 1,079 
Kyrgyzstan 0,315 1500 1,144 
Iraq 0,328 1200 1,003 
Bahrain 0,344 1200 0,944 
Turkey 0,401 6352 1,222 
Ecuador 0,403 1202 1,296 
Indonesia 0,421 3002 1,239 
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South Korea 0,437 2400 1,209 
Viet Nam 0,454 1495 1,318 
Armenia 0,472 1100 1,082 
Malaysia 0,479 2500 0,959 
Lebanon 0,495 1200 1,081 
Thailand 0,503 2708 1,135 
Saudi Arabia 0,509 1502 1,147 
Yemen 0,518 1000 1,130 
Jordan 0,562 3623 1,154 
India 0,687 5583 1,190 
Bangladesh 0,712 3025 1,266 
Palestinian Occupied 
Territories 
0,747 1000 1,243 
Azerbaijan 0,747 1002 1,198 
Libya 1,092 2131 1,187 
 
 
Appendix Graph 9: value development in global society, as predicted by our 
data and GDP per capita34 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
34 For the GDP per capita data, see Tausch & Heshmati, 2013. 
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Appendix Table 16: UNDP-type Index of a democratic civil society 
 
Country/region Important child 
qualities: 
tolerance and 
respect for other 
people 
accept 
neighbours: 
People of a 
different 
religion 
men do not make 
better political 
leaders than 
women do 
University is 
equally important 
for a boy and a 
girl 
Democracy: no 
priority for 
religious 
authorities to 
interpret the laws. 
not justifiable: 
For a man to 
beat his wife 
UNDP-type Index 
of a democratic 
civil society 
Sweden 1,000 0,964 0,943 0,907 0,990 0,959 0,961 
Norway 0,778 0,964 1,000 1,000 0,954 0,975 0,945 
Andorra 0,963 0,982 0,845 0,736 1,000 0,997 0,921 
Netherlands 0,926 0,964 0,855 0,793 0,914 0,970 0,904 
Switzerland 0,852 0,946 0,876 0,807 0,955 0,921 0,893 
Canada 0,852 0,982 0,793 0,764 0,801 1,000 0,865 
New Zealand 0,833 1,000 0,772 0,700 0,915 0,962 0,864 
Finland 0,907 0,839 0,834 0,764 0,856 0,970 0,862 
France 0,944 0,554 0,881 0,964 0,823 0,967 0,856 
Australia 0,852 0,964 0,736 0,686 0,877 0,959 0,846 
Great Britain 0,926 0,982 0,741 0,664 0,713 0,956 0,830 
Germany 0,759 0,839 0,839 0,693 0,945 0,850 0,821 
Trinidad and Tobago 0,870 0,964 0,736 0,793 0,670 0,883 0,819 
Spain 0,704 0,946 0,824 0,664 0,758 0,932 0,805 
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United States 0,722 0,964 0,736 0,686 0,779 0,907 0,799 
Uruguay 0,778 0,946 0,777 0,600 0,726 0,880 0,785 
Slovenia 0,741 0,750 0,663 0,614 0,877 0,896 0,757 
Colombia 0,722 0,875 0,658 0,593 0,541 0,964 0,726 
Poland 0,870 0,875 0,497 0,457 0,658 0,970 0,721 
Brazil 0,537 0,929 0,668 0,621 0,655 0,913 0,721 
Chile 0,741 0,911 0,617 0,471 0,624 0,951 0,719 
Taiwan 0,704 0,929 0,585 0,471 0,741 0,869 0,717 
Cyprus 0,630 0,696 0,663 0,700 0,710 0,893 0,715 
Argentina 0,500 0,982 0,674 0,579 0,599 0,954 0,715 
Hungary 0,296 0,911 0,575 0,693 0,756 0,978 0,702 
Peru 0,593 0,839 0,731 0,471 0,589 0,801 0,671 
Estonia 0,722 0,625 0,435 0,564 0,740 0,923 0,668 
Bulgaria 0,259 0,732 0,440 0,593 0,844 0,836 0,617 
Mexico 0,519 0,750 0,642 0,414 0,574 0,795 0,616 
Zimbabwe 0,630 0,893 0,435 0,579 0,597 0,552 0,614 
Ecuador 0,593 0,446 0,731 0,514 0,537 0,861 0,614 
Japan 0,481 0,429 0,544 0,379 0,912 0,915 0,610 
Romania 0,519 0,643 0,440 0,536 0,584 0,910 0,605 
Russia 0,593 0,750 0,378 0,343 0,706 0,844 0,602 
China 0,389 0,804 0,482 0,429 0,741 0,765 0,602 
Singapore 0,463 0,821 0,528 0,464 0,640 0,645 0,594 
Global Sample 0,574 0,661 0,482 0,471 0,584 0,773 0,591 
Ethiopia 0,000 0,750 0,808 0,721 0,363 0,888 0,588 
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Moldova 0,611 0,643 0,399 0,429 0,642 0,792 0,586 
Kazakhstan 0,444 0,804 0,342 0,493 0,635 0,675 0,566 
Ukraine 0,444 0,732 0,399 0,343 0,615 0,825 0,560 
Belarus 0,519 0,696 0,295 0,350 0,652 0,833 0,558 
South Korea 0,241 0,500 0,487 0,421 0,771 0,877 0,550 
Georgia 0,500 0,446 0,254 0,464 0,602 0,997 0,544 
Hong Kong 0,056 0,714 0,601 0,400 0,700 0,787 0,543 
Serbia and Montenegro 0,519 0,768 0,591 0,629 0,637 0,003 0,525 
Ghana 0,593 0,607 0,176 0,479 0,577 0,694 0,521 
South Africa 0,537 0,821 0,503 0,564 0,260 0,440 0,521 
Turkey 0,519 0,393 0,358 0,457 0,453 0,915 0,516 
Qatar 0,759 0,804 0,031 0,364 0,313 0,811 0,514 
Thailand 0,463 0,482 0,487 0,386 0,529 0,727 0,512 
Burkina Faso 0,611 0,804 0,363 0,271 0,667 0,328 0,507 
Indonesia 0,444 0,393 0,404 0,500 0,294 0,948 0,497 
Azerbaijan 0,500 0,393 0,275 0,279 0,687 0,811 0,491 
Kyrgyzstan 0,463 0,411 0,399 0,307 0,607 0,735 0,487 
Uzbekistan 0,833 0,750 0,124 0,100 0,451 0,617 0,479 
Rwanda 0,444 0,661 0,497 0,321 0,534 0,402 0,477 
Tunisia 0,352 0,482 0,171 0,493 0,549 0,746 0,466 
Iran 0,481 0,500 0,295 0,171 0,418 0,828 0,449 
Lebanon 0,204 0,411 0,415 0,421 0,647 0,571 0,445 
Pakistan 0,315 0,768 0,342 0,300 0,053 0,885 0,444 
Malaysia 0,704 0,536 0,311 0,171 0,340 0,596 0,443 
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Jordan 0,685 0,357 0,057 0,393 0,224 0,896 0,435 
Viet Nam 0,389 0,411 0,451 0,450 0,000 0,874 0,429 
Morocco 0,500 0,518 0,285 0,329 0,285 0,653 0,428 
Zambia 0,407 0,554 0,497 0,514 0,469 0,128 0,428 
Philippines 0,389 0,732 0,394 0,243 0,363 0,377 0,416 
Armenia 0,278 0,000 0,238 0,293 0,730 0,888 0,405 
Nigeria 0,500 0,518 0,155 0,207 0,441 0,604 0,404 
Occupied Palestinian 
Territories 
0,630 0,125 0,104 0,429 0,431 0,661 0,397 
Libya 0,815 0,054 0,114 0,314 0,330 0,749 0,396 
Iraq 0,815 0,411 0,000 0,207 0,300 0,549 0,380 
Algeria 0,407 0,357 0,207 0,350 0,453 0,432 0,368 
India 0,407 0,214 0,415 0,186 0,551 0,355 0,355 
Yemen 0,815 0,071 0,052 0,150 0,234 0,702 0,337 
Bahrain 0,019 0,429 0,275 0,000 0,506 0,740 0,328 
Mali 0,444 0,589 0,161 0,007 0,371 0,000 0,262 
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Appendix Map 1: Important child qualities: tolerance and respect for other people 
 
 
 
Best: New Zealand, Argentina, Great Britain, Canada, Andorra 
Worst: Ethiopia, Bahrain, Hong Kong, Lebanon, South Korea 
0,00
0,13
0,25
0,38
0,50
0,63
0,75
0,88
1,00
1,13
source: our ow n calculations and http://w w w .clearlyandsimply.com/clearly_and_simply/2009/06/choropleth-maps-w ith-excel.html
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Appendix Map 2: accept neighbors: People of a different religion 
 
 
 
Best: New Zealand, Argentina, Great Britain, Canada, Andorra 
Worst: Armenia, Libya, Yemen, Occupied Palestinian Territories, India 
  
0,00
0,13
0,25
0,38
0,50
0,63
0,75
0,88
1,00
1,13
source: our ow n calculations and http://w w w .clearlyandsimply.com/clearly_and_simply/2009/06/choropleth-maps-w ith-excel.html
97 
 
Appendix Map 3: men do not make better political leaders than women do 
 
 
 
Best: Norway, Sweden, France, Switzerland, Netherlands 
Worst: Iraq, Qatar, Yemen, Jordan, Occupied Palestinian Territories 
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Appendix Map 4: University is equally important for a boy and a girl 
 
 
 
Best: Norway, France, Sweden, Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago 
Worst: Bahrain, Mali, Uzbekistan, Yemen, Iran 
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Appendix Map 5: Democracy: no priority for religious authorities to interpret the laws 
 
 
Best: Andorra, Sweden, Switzerland, Norway, Germany 
Worst: Viet Nam, Pakistan, Jordan, Yemen, South Africa 
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Appendix Map 6: not justifiable: For a man to beat his wife 
 
 
Best: Canada, Georgia, Andorra, Hungary, Norway 
Worst: Mali, Serbia and Montenegro, Zambia, Burkina Faso, India 
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Appendix Map 7: The non-violent and law-abiding society 
 
 
 
Best: Azerbaijan; Georgia; Jordan; Yemen; Tunisia 
Worst: South Africa; India; Philippines; Mexico; Algeria 
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-3,11 to -2,12
-2,12 to -1,14
-1,14 to -0,15
-0,15 to 0,83
0,83 to 1,82
1,82 to 2,80
2,80 or more
source: our own calculations and http://www.clearlyandsimply.com/
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Appendix Map 8: Democracy movement 
 
 
 
Best: Sweden; Taiwan; Germany; Spain; Estonia 
Worst: Bahrain; India; Lebanon; Palestinian Occupied Territories; Qatar 
  
-3,63 to -3,03
-3,03 to -2,44
-2,44 to -1,84
-1,84 to -1,24
-1,24 to -0,65
-0,65 to -0,05
-0,05 to 0,55
0,55 to 1,14
1,14 to 1,74
1,74 or more
source: our own calculations and http://www.clearlyandsimply.com/
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Appendix Map 9: Climate of personal non-violence 
 
 
 
Best: Chile; Japan; Korea, South; Spain; Ecuador 
Worst: Rwanda; South Africa; India; Singapore; Philippines 
  
-3,02 to -2,51
-2,51 to -2,00
-2,00 to -1,48
-1,48 to -0,97
-0,97 to -0,46
-0,46 to 0,05
0,05 to 0,56
0,56 to 1,08
1,08 to 1,59
1,59 or more
source: our own calculations and http://www.clearlyandsimply.com/
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Appendix Map 10: Trust in institutions 
 
 
 
Best: Uzbekistan; Qatar; China; Singapore; Malaysia 
Worst: Yemen; Tunisia; Egypt; Libya; Pakistan 
  
-2,19 to -1,62
-1,62 to -1,04
-1,04 to -0,46
-0,46 to 0,12
0,12 to 0,70
0,70 to 1,28
1,28 to 1,85
1,85 to 2,43
2,43 to 3,01
3,01 or more
source: our own calculations and http://www.clearlyandsimply.com/
105 
 
Appendix Map 11: Happiness, good health 
 
 
 
Best: Qatar; Nigeria; Ghana; Rwanda; Kuwait 
Worst: Egypt; Ukraine; Belarus; Russia; Georgia 
  
-3,59 to -3,05
-3,05 to -2,51
-2,51 to -1,97
-1,97 to -1,43
-1,43 to -0,89
-0,89 to -0,35
-0,35 to 0,19
0,19 to 0,73
0,73 to 1,27
1,27 or more
source: our own calculations and http://www.clearlyandsimply.com/
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Appendix Map 12: no redistributive religious fundamentalism 
 
 
 
Best: Sweden; Netherlands; Australia; Japan; Germany 
Worst: Pakistan; Egypt; Yemen; Philippines; Qatar 
  
-2,21 to -1,74
-1,74 to -1,27
-1,27 to -0,80
-0,80 to -0,34
-0,34 to 0,13
0,13 to 0,60
0,60 to 1,07
1,07 to 1,53
1,53 to 2,00
2,00 or more
source: our own calculations and http://www.clearlyandsimply.com/
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Appendix Map 13: Accepting the market economy 
 
 
 
Best: Trinidad and Tobago; Yemen; Ghana; Tunisia; Libya 
Worst: Bahrain; South Africa; Azerbaijan; Russia; Ukraine 
  
-1,92 to -1,58
-1,58 to -1,24
-1,24 to -0,89
-0,89 to -0,55
-0,55 to -0,21
-0,21 to 0,14
0,14 to 0,48
0,48 to 0,83
0,83 to 1,17
1,17 or more
source: our own calculations and http://www.clearlyandsimply.com/
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Appendix Map 14: Feminism 
 
 
 
Best: Trinidad and Tobago; Sweden; Uruguay; Peru; Colombia 
Worst: Kuwait; Yemen; Bahrain; Jordan; Libya 
  
-1,20 to -0,95
-0,95 to -0,69
-0,69 to -0,44
-0,44 to -0,19
-0,19 to 0,06
0,06 to 0,31
0,31 to 0,57
0,57 to 0,82
0,82 to 1,07
1,07 or more
source: our own calculations and http://www.clearlyandsimply.com/
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Appendix Map 15: Involvement in politics 
 
 
 
Best: Thailand; Japan; Bahrain; Egypt; Kuwait 
Worst: Azerbaijan; Chile; Slovenia; Spain; Colombia 
  
-1,02 to -0,81
-0,81 to -0,60
-0,60 to -0,39
-0,39 to -0,18
-0,18 to 0,04
0,04 to 0,25
0,25 to 0,46
0,46 to 0,67
0,67 to 0,88
0,88 or more
source: our own calculations and http://www.clearlyandsimply.com/
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Appendix Map 16: Optimism and engagement 
 
 
 
Best: Qatar; Libya; Nigeria; Georgia; Cyprus 
Worst: Bahrain; India; Russia; Pakistan; Philippines 
  
-1,52 to -1,28
-1,28 to -1,04
-1,04 to -0,80
-0,80 to -0,56
-0,56 to -0,32
-0,32 to -0,08
-0,08 to 0,16
0,16 to 0,40
0,40 to 0,64
0,64 or more
source: our own calculations and http://www.clearlyandsimply.com/
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Appendix Map 17: No welfare mentality, acceptancy of the Calvinist work ethics 
 
 
 
Best: Ghana; Trinidad and Tobago; Zimbabwe; Qatar; Yemen 
Worst: Slovenia; Russia; China; Germany; Ukraine 
  
-1,18 to -0,94
-0,94 to -0,69
-0,69 to -0,44
-0,44 to -0,20
-0,20 to 0,05
0,05 to 0,29
0,29 to 0,54
0,54 to 0,79
0,79 to 1,03
1,03 or more
source: our own calculations and http://www.clearlyandsimply.com/
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Appendix Map 18: Catholic The non-violent and law-abiding society 
 
 
 
Best: Germany; Trinidad and Tobago; Ghana; Rwanda; Australia 
Worst: South Africa; Philippines; Mexico; Peru; Lebanon 
  
-7,05 to -5,94
-5,94 to -4,84
-4,84 to -3,73
-3,73 to -2,63
-2,63 to -1,52
-1,52 to -0,42
-0,42 to 0,69
0,69 to 1,79
1,79 to 2,89
2,89 or more
source: our own calculations and http://www.clearlyandsimply.com/
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Appendix Map 19: Catholic Democracy movement 
 
 
 
Best: Ukraine; Chile; Germany; Poland; Slovenia 
Worst: Singapore; Ecuador; South Africa; Colombia; Lebanon 
  
-1,99 to -1,55
-1,55 to -1,12
-1,12 to -0,68
-0,68 to -0,25
-0,25 to 0,19
0,19 to 0,62
0,62 to 1,06
1,06 to 1,49
1,49 to 1,93
1,93 or more
source: our own calculations and http://www.clearlyandsimply.com/
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Appendix Map 20: Catholic Climate of personal non-violence 
 
 
 
Best: Chile; Ukraine; Spain; Ecuador; Poland 
Worst: South Africa; Rwanda; Zimbabwe; Nigeria; Philippines 
  
-3,44 to -2,89
-2,89 to -2,33
-2,33 to -1,78
-1,78 to -1,23
-1,23 to -0,68
-0,68 to -0,13
-0,13 to 0,42
0,42 to 0,97
0,97 to 1,52
1,52 or more
source: our own calculations and http://www.clearlyandsimply.com/
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Appendix Map 21: Catholic Trust in institutions 
 
 
 
Best: Chile; Singapore; Philippines; Ghana; Germany 
Worst: Ukraine; Slovenia; Lebanon; Peru; Mexico 
  
-1,64 to -1,33
-1,33 to -1,03
-1,03 to -0,72
-0,72 to -0,42
-0,42 to -0,11
-0,11 to 0,19
0,19 to 0,49
0,49 to 0,80
0,80 to 1,10
1,10 or more
source: our own calculations and http://www.clearlyandsimply.com/
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Appendix Map 22: Catholic Happiness, good health 
 
 
 
Best: Ghana; Nigeria; Rwanda; Trinidad and Tobago; Mexico 
Worst: Belarus; Chile; Ukraine; Germany; Spain 
  
-2,57 to -2,11
-2,11 to -1,66
-1,66 to -1,20
-1,20 to -0,75
-0,75 to -0,29
-0,29 to 0,16
0,16 to 0,62
0,62 to 1,07
1,07 to 1,53
1,53 or more
source: our own calculations and http://www.clearlyandsimply.com/
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Appendix Map 23: Catholic No redistributive religious fundamentalism 
 
 
 
Best: United States; Australia; Germany; Trinidad and Tobago; Slovenia 
Worst: Philippines; South Africa; Belarus; Nigeria; Ecuador 
  
-1,58 to -1,31
-1,31 to -1,04
-1,04 to -0,77
-0,77 to -0,50
-0,50 to -0,23
-0,23 to 0,04
0,04 to 0,31
0,31 to 0,58
0,58 to 0,85
0,85 or more
source: our own calculations and http://www.clearlyandsimply.com/
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Appendix Map 24: Catholic Accepting the market economy 
 
 
 
Best: Ghana; Trinidad and Tobago; Zimbabwe; Australia; Brazil 
Worst: South Africa; Poland; Argentina; Belarus; Singapore 
  
-1,17 to -0,92
-0,92 to -0,66
-0,66 to -0,40
-0,40 to -0,15
-0,15 to 0,11
0,11 to 0,37
0,37 to 0,63
0,63 to 0,88
0,88 to 1,14
1,14 or more
source: our own calculations and http://www.clearlyandsimply.com/
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Appendix Map 25: Catholic Feminism 
 
 
 
Best: Trinidad and Tobago; Peru; Brazil; Mexico; Colombia 
Worst: Nigeria; Lebanon; Philippines; Ghana; Singapore 
  
-0,41 to -0,21
-0,21 to -0,01
-0,01 to 0,19
0,19 to 0,39
0,39 to 0,59
0,59 to 0,79
0,79 to 0,99
0,99 to 1,19
1,19 to 1,39
1,39 or more
source: our own calculations and http://www.clearlyandsimply.com/
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Appendix Map 26: Catholic Involvement in politics 
 
 
 
Best: Germany; United States; Philippines; Australia; Trinidad and Tobago 
Worst: Colombia; Slovenia; Chile; Spain; Peru 
  
-0,65 to -0,51
-0,51 to -0,36
-0,36 to -0,22
-0,22 to -0,07
-0,07 to 0,07
0,07 to 0,21
0,21 to 0,36
0,36 to 0,50
0,50 to 0,65
0,65 or more
source: our own calculations and http://www.clearlyandsimply.com/
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Appendix Map 27: Catholic Optimism and engagement 
 
 
 
Best: Ghana; Trinidad and Tobago; Nigeria; Rwanda; Mexico 
Worst: Ukraine; Germany; Belarus; Philippines; Peru 
  
-0,77 to -0,61
-0,61 to -0,45
-0,45 to -0,29
-0,29 to -0,13
-0,13 to 0,04
0,04 to 0,20
0,20 to 0,36
0,36 to 0,52
0,52 to 0,68
0,68 or more
source: our own calculations and http://www.clearlyandsimply.com/
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Appendix Map 28: Catholic No welfare mentality, acceptancy of the Calvinist work ethics 
 
 
 
Best: Ghana; Trinidad and Tobago; Zimbabwe; Peru; Mexico 
Worst: Germany; Slovenia; Rwanda; Belarus; Ukraine 
  
-1,01 to -0,76
-0,76 to -0,52
-0,52 to -0,27
-0,27 to -0,03
-0,03 to 0,22
0,22 to 0,46
0,46 to 0,71
0,71 to 0,95
0,95 to 1,20
1,20 or more
source: our own calculations and http://www.clearlyandsimply.com/
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Appendix Map 29: Catholic „dominicantes“ best practicing community? The non-violent and law-abiding society 
 
 
 
Best: Germany; Chile; Spain; Colombia; Australia 
Worst: Nigeria; South Africa; United States; Peru; Korea, South 
  
-1,23 to -0,95
-0,95 to -0,67
-0,67 to -0,38
-0,38 to -0,10
-0,10 to 0,18
0,18 to 0,46
0,46 to 0,75
0,75 to 1,03
1,03 to 1,31
1,31 or more
source: our own calculations and http://www.clearlyandsimply.com/
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Appendix Map 30: Catholic „dominicantes“ best practicing community? Democracy movement 
 
 
 
Best: Ukraine; Lebanon; Nigeria; Chile; Ghana 
Worst: Spain; Belarus; Australia; Singapore; Korea, South 
  
-1,08 to -0,89
-0,89 to -0,70
-0,70 to -0,50
-0,50 to -0,31
-0,31 to -0,12
-0,12 to 0,08
0,08 to 0,27
0,27 to 0,46
0,46 to 0,66
0,66 or more
source: our own calculations and http://www.clearlyandsimply.com/
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Appendix Map 31: Catholic „dominicantes“ best practicing community? Climate of personal non-violence 
 
 
 
Best: Trinidad and Tobago; Lebanon; Ukraine; Brazil; Slovenia 
Worst: Nigeria; South Africa; Zimbabwe; Peru; United States 
  
-0,71 to -0,57
-0,57 to -0,44
-0,44 to -0,30
-0,30 to -0,16
-0,16 to -0,03
-0,03 to 0,11
0,11 to 0,24
0,24 to 0,38
0,38 to 0,52
0,52 or more
source: our own calculations and http://www.clearlyandsimply.com/
126 
 
Appendix Map 32: Catholic „dominicantes“ best practicing community? Trust in institutions 
 
 
 
Best: Chile; Germany; Belarus; Nigeria; South Africa 
Worst: Ukraine; Australia; Slovenia; Singapore; Rwanda 
  
-0,90 to -0,68
-0,68 to -0,46
-0,46 to -0,24
-0,24 to -0,01
-0,01 to 0,21
0,21 to 0,43
0,43 to 0,65
0,65 to 0,88
0,88 to 1,10
1,10 or more
source: our own calculations and http://www.clearlyandsimply.com/
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Appendix Map 33: Catholic „dominicantes“ best practicing community? Happiness, good health 
 
 
 
Best: Ghana; United States; Ukraine; Nigeria; Rwanda 
Worst: Germany; Chile; Spain; Belarus; Slovenia 
  
-1,11 to -0,94
-0,94 to -0,77
-0,77 to -0,60
-0,60 to -0,42
-0,42 to -0,25
-0,25 to -0,08
-0,08 to 0,09
0,09 to 0,26
0,26 to 0,43
0,43 or more
source: our own calculations and http://www.clearlyandsimply.com/
128 
 
Appendix Map 34: Catholic „dominicantes“ best practicing community? No redistributive religious fundamentalism 
 
 
 
Best: Ghana; Rwanda; Zimbabwe; Nigeria; Singapore 
Worst: Belarus; Spain; Slovenia; Australia; Germany 
  
-1,51 to -1,32
-1,32 to -1,13
-1,13 to -0,95
-0,95 to -0,76
-0,76 to -0,57
-0,57 to -0,38
-0,38 to -0,20
-0,20 to -0,01
-0,01 to 0,18
0,18 or more
source: our own calculations and http://www.clearlyandsimply.com/
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Appendix Map 35: Catholic „dominicantes“ best practicing community? Accepting the market economy 
 
 
 
Best: Australia; Ukraine; Spain; Germany; Brazil 
Worst: South Africa; Trinidad and Tobago; Peru; Philippines; Zimbabwe 
  
-0,16 to -0,09
-0,09 to -0,02
-0,02 to 0,06
0,06 to 0,13
0,13 to 0,20
0,20 to 0,27
0,27 to 0,35
0,35 to 0,42
0,42 to 0,49
0,49 or more
source: our own calculations and http://www.clearlyandsimply.com/
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Appendix Map 36: Catholic „dominicantes“ best practicing community? Feminism 
 
 
 
Best: Belarus; Trinidad and Tobago; Nigeria; Slovenia; Brazil 
Worst: Singapore; Zimbabwe; Germany; Spain; Argentina 
  
-0,20 to -0,12
-0,12 to -0,05
-0,05 to 0,02
0,02 to 0,09
0,09 to 0,17
0,17 to 0,24
0,24 to 0,31
0,31 to 0,38
0,38 to 0,45
0,45 or more
source: our own calculations and http://www.clearlyandsimply.com/
131 
 
Appendix Map 37: Catholic „dominicantes“ best practicing community? Involvement in politics 
 
 
 
Best: Belarus; Ukraine; Germany; Singapore; Trinidad and Tobago 
Worst: Lebanon; Nigeria; Philippines; Peru; Rwanda 
  
-0,35 to -0,26
-0,26 to -0,16
-0,16 to -0,07
-0,07 to 0,03
0,03 to 0,13
0,13 to 0,22
0,22 to 0,32
0,32 to 0,41
0,41 to 0,51
0,51 or more
source: our own calculations and http://www.clearlyandsimply.com/
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Appendix Map 38: Catholic „dominicantes“ best practicing community? Optimism and engagement 
 
 
 
 
Best: Trinidad and Tobago; Ghana; Korea, South; Slovenia; Colombia 
Worst: Ukraine; Argentina; Australia; Chile; Spain 
  
-0,51 to -0,41
-0,41 to -0,31
-0,31 to -0,21
-0,21 to -0,11
-0,11 to -0,02
-0,02 to 0,08
0,08 to 0,18
0,18 to 0,28
0,28 to 0,38
0,38 or more
source: our own calculations and http://www.clearlyandsimply.com/
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Appendix Map 39: Catholic „dominicantes“ best practicing community? No welfare mentality, acceptancy of the Calvinist work ethics 
 
 
 
Best: Australia; United States; Ukraine; Slovenia; Ghana 
Worst: Nigeria; Zimbabwe; Trinidad and Tobago; Ecuador; Argentina 
  
-0,22 to -0,14
-0,14 to -0,06
-0,06 to 0,03
0,03 to 0,11
0,11 to 0,19
0,19 to 0,28
0,28 to 0,36
0,36 to 0,44
0,44 to 0,53
0,53 or more
source: our own calculations and http://www.clearlyandsimply.com/
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Appendix Map 40: Muslim Overall Value Development Index 
 
 
 
Best: Uzbekistan; Trinidad and Tobago; Cyprus; Ghana; Turkey 
Worst: India; Philippines; Russia; Lebanon; South Africa 
  
-11,96 to -10,14
-10,14 to -8,32
-8,32 to -6,49
-6,49 to -4,67
-4,67 to -2,85
-2,85 to -1,03
-1,03 to 0,80
0,80 to 2,62
2,62 to 4,44
4,44 or more
source: our own calculations and http://www.clearlyandsimply.com/
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Appendix Map 41: Ranks according to the Overall Civil Society Index 
 
 
 
 
-6,25 to 1,00
1,00 to 8,25
8,25 to 15,50
15,50 to 22,75
22,75 to 30,00
30,00 to 37,25
37,25 to 44,50
44,50 to 51,75
51,75 to 59,00
59,00 or more
source: our own calculations and http://www.clearlyandsimply.com/
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Table 17: rejecting Muslim neighbors among Catholic dominicantes 
 
 
 % rejecting 
Muslim 
neighbors 
N = 
Slovakia 51,000 147 
Czech Rep. 45,100 51 
South Korea 36,300 193 
Philippines 28,900 1171 
Germany 28,600 91 
Nigeria 28,300 654 
South Africa 26,700 210 
Albania 23,500 119 
Spain 18,200 954 
Global 
dominicantes 
17,900 9185 
Mexico 17,900 1295 
Zimbabwe 16,700 132 
Peru 16,600 567 
Uganda 15,600 282 
India 14,900 87 
Bosnia 13,100 84 
Tanzania 13,000 292 
Canada 12,400 443 
United States 8,700 332 
Chile 8,400 514 
Argentina 7,100 411 
Guatemala 6,800 397 
Switzerland 4,800 314 
Brazil 0,000 398 
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Graph 10: The factor scores of our model for global Catholicism, 
comparing the completely distant Catholics, the secular Catholics and the 
mensuantes 
 
 
 
Graph 11: The factor scores of our model for global Muslims, comparing 
the completely distant Muslims, the secular Muslims and the mensuantes 
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Graph 12: US Catholic values and overall US values 
 
 
 
Graph 13: Value development in Germany 
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Table 18: International comparisons of dominicantes, overall societies and 
Muslim communities 
 
 
  Overall Civil 
Society Index 
Trinidad and Tobago dominicantes 7,783 
Ghana dominicantes 6,808 
Trinidad and Tobago overall society 5,751 
Germany dominicantes 5,004 
Ghana overall society 4,76 
Germany overall society 4,274 
Trinidad and Tobago Muslims 3,5438 
Ghana Muslims 3,0148 
Germany Muslims 0,8106 
Rwanda dominicantes 0,511 
Rwanda overall society 0,402 
Nigeria Muslims 0,0844 
Nigeria overall society 0,042 
Rwanda Muslims -0,0813 
Nigeria dominicantes -0,334 
Singapore overall society -1,482 
Singapore Muslims -1,5741 
Singapore dominicantes -1,621 
Lebanon dominicantes -4,381 
Lebanon overall society -5,183 
Philippines dominicantes -5,763 
Philippines overall society -5,774 
South Africa Muslims -6,7246 
Lebanon Muslims -7,0308 
Philippines Muslims -9,5032 
South Africa overall society -9,691 
South Africa dominicantes -10,733 
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